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Abstract 
We investigate how the realignment in political landscape (local policy risk) increases IPO mispricing. Using 
the concept of corporate proximity to political power, we find that local policy risk amplifies adverse 
selection problems, which leads to higher underpricing. Economically, a shift on the political map from an 
area completely opposed to the ruling party to being completely aligned translates to $12 million left on the 
table for the average issuer. While politically active firms successfully manage this policy realignment risk, 
the other firms bear majority of its consequences. We also demonstrate considerable heterogeneity on the 
impact of uncertainty emanating from the dynamic nature of the political landscape across industries, states, 
and firms. Lastly, we document that policy risk has a substantial adverse impact on the survival of IPO 
issuers. 
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1. Introduction 
“When economists talk of political risk, they usually mean…national elections…But there is another kind of 
political risk: the temptation for governments of all political colours to change the rules, whether they relate 
to tax, the way that companies operate or how markets behave. And that risk has increased significantly 
since the 2008 crisis” 
[Economist, Buttonwood, November 9, 2013] 
Traditionally, politicians make decisions that alter the environment in which firms operate in, and 
they do so more often when the economy is weaker. This process could have a positive effect on asset prices 
if governments and regulatory institutions respond properly to such unanticipated economic shocks. As 
Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) argue, this type of uncertainty can be a common feature of even the 
healthiest political process; yet, anecdotal evidence suggest that in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis, surges in policy initiatives – as reflected in a wave of government interventions – were a 
major contributing factor to the sluggish economic recovery (Economist, 2013). This observation has fueled 
an intense debate about whether government actions benefit the economy, a debate that is still ongoing. 
Responding to this controversy, a budding literature documents that greater levels of policy 
uncertainty can have adverse effects on both financial and real activities. Regarding the financial 
implications, distortions in the firms’ information environment, due to exogenous political shocks, make it 
more difficult for investors to accurately price a company, which in turn increases the cost of capital (e.g., 
Boutchkova et al., 2012; Brogaard and Detzel, 2015). As for the real effects, uncertainty increases the option 
value of waiting, making thus firms more cautious in their investment behavior and undermining their growth 
prospects (e.g., Julio and Yook, 2012, 2013; Jens, 2017). 
The research on the pricing implications of the political environment has primarily focused on large, 
established corporations (Brogaard and Detzel, 2015; Pasquariello and Zafeiridou, 2014), giving far less 
attention to small, young, fast-growing, entrepreneurial firms such as those conducting an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO). We argue that a detailed examination of the empirical implications of political uncertainty on 
the pricing of newly listed firms is warranted as: (1) firms moving from start-ups to professionally managed 
companies are especially affected by (political) uncertainty shocks, since they do not have established track 
records and suffer from a “liability of newness”  (Certo, 2003; Çolak et al., 2017); (2) IPOs constitute an 
important milestone for individual firms because their success largely determines the amount of cash raised, 
and consequently influences the ability of a firm with limited resources to propel its growth and solidify its 
competitive advantage (Kenney et al., 2012; Borisov et al., 2017); and (3) IPOs are also crucial for the 
aggregate economy because a vibrant market for Initial Public Offerings is a vital asset for the aggregate 
economy given its role in facilitating entrepreneurship, venture capital, job creation, and sustainable growth 
(Black and Gilson, 1998; Doidge et al., 2013).  
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We endeavor to contribute to this literature by formulating the following questions. How do IPO 
investors perceive political realignment risk and what is the price the issuing firms pay for such risk? Do IPO 
issuers engage in actions to actively mitigate the potential adverse effects of this type of political uncertainty? 
To what extent does the impact of policy risk depend on firm-specific attributes, industry or even state 
policy-related characteristics? Finally, does the influence of such policy-related uncertainty extend beyond 
the first trading day? 
The theoretical insights by Pastor and Veronesi (2012; 2013) suggest that political uncertainty 
commands a risk premium and depresses asset prices. Although several studies provide corroborating 
evidence to this proposition for SEOs (Brogaard and Detzel, 2015) and for IPOs (Colak, et al., 2017), there is 
no clear evidence on how local political realignment and the associated risks affect equity mispricing and 
issuance discount (underpricing). We show that local policy risk increases adverse selection costs for the IPO 
firms, which in turn is reflected in higher underpricing. More specifically, we examine how uncertainty about 
the impact of an administration’s policies varies across different areas of the political map by utilizing the 
political alignment index (PAI) proposed by Kim et al. (2012), which exploits exogenous state-level variation 
in the degree of partisanship. The main advantage of this approach is that it acknowledges that election 
events do not completely resolve the political uncertainty, as decision agents would still not know which of 
the promised policies the newly elected politicians would eventually implement and how these policies 
would affect corporate outcomes (Antia at el., 2013). As such, it allows for the possibility that the well 
documented effects of electoral risk may extend beyond election cycles.
1
  
To better understand why political alignment may affect the likelihood, the nature, and the impact of 
future government policies consider that the U.S. political landscape gets rearranged every two years, 
following Presidential and midterm elections. Post-election shifts in the political landscape result in changes 
to the degree of local politicians’ partisan alignment with the President’s party, affecting their access to 
political power. Accordingly, the resulting political discretion directly affects the effectiveness of the 
legislative activity, as it leads to the emergence of new items in the political agenda, on the one hand, and to 
increased potential favoritism of majority party politicians to some of their local constituents, on the other 
hand. Both of these channels, however, may have policy risk implications and economic welfare implications 
as well (Kim et al., 2012). 
                                                             
1 One of the main empirical challenges in the political science literature lies in the selection of an appropriate measure of political 
uncertainty. In particular, one strand of the literature employs news-based measures (e.g., Gulen and Ion, 2016; Bonaime et al., 
2018), such as the text-based uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016). This measure allows for a continuous tracking of policy risk; 
nonetheless, it is subject to potential endogeneity problems because uncertainty is countercyclical (Jens, 2017). To separate the 
effects of political cycles from business cycles, other studies use discrete prescheduled events such as Presidential or Gubernatorial 
elections, as a plausible source of exogenous uncertainty (e.g., Boutchkova et al., 2012; Belo et al., 2015; Jens, 2017, and others). 
Yet, the inferences from these studies may be artificially precise because the passing of an election does not necessarily indicate the 
complete resolution of uncertainty surrounding future government actions (Brogaard and Detzel, 2015). 
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With respect to the policy risk implications, several studies from the political science literature assert 
that greater political proximity enables policy makers to dominate senate and house committees in Congress, 
thereby enhancing their capacity of sponsoring, drafting, and passing new legislation (Malkiel, 1979; 
Anderson et al., 2003; Krutz, 2005). However, Fowler (2006) argues that when one party has full control, the 
extent of negotiations and the potential to limit the range of policy changes is lower than under divided 
governments. This implies that a unified government, or more broadly, greater political proximity to 
powerful politicians is associated with less predictable future outcomes. In support of this argument, prior 
studies show that, while greater partisanship leads to greater legislative interference, it also injects 
uncertainty regarding the redistribution of future growth opportunities among firms within an area (Ferguson 
and Witte, 2006; Füss and Bechtel, 2008). 
In a similar vein, models of political risk show that changes in government policies exert an adverse 
market-wide effect that is largely non-diversifiable. For example, Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) 
demonstrate that, in a setting where rational economic agents formulate decisions based on expectations 
about future policy initiatives; even market-benevolent policy makers can increase risk, if their future actions 
are surrounded by considerable uncertainty. In such a case, political uncertainty commands a risk premium 
and depresses asset prices. As such, while political uncertainty emanating from changes in the political map 
can shape a firms’ information environment, its adverse impact is not the same across different areas of the 
political landscape, instead it should be pronounced in areas of greater political alignment.  
Arguably, firms issuing public equity for the first time face a variety of constrains imposed by 
asymmetric information regarding the value of assets-in place and growth options. This translates to adverse 
selection problems, which in turn might substantially reduce the demand for IPO’s shares, and consequently, 
the amount of proceeds. To mitigate such problems, IPO issuers may choose several mechanisms. One such 
mechanism is underpricing the issue, that is, selling the shares at discount. In a market characterized by 
heterogeneously informed investors, underpricing does not only stimulate demand and persuades informed 
investors to reveal private information about the offer (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), but most importantly, it 
compensates uninformed investors for the winner’s curse, as the latter bear the risk of holding too many bad 
stocks (Ritter, 1984, Rock, 1986).  
Based on this discussion, one could anticipate that IPO firms located in areas with greater political 
alignment with the ruling party are exposed to more diverse implications of policy risk, and hence, suffer 
from severe adverse selection problems. In other words, political proximity should be related with greater 
IPO underpricing. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, political proximity may also have economic welfare 
implications. As several papers note, it is conceivable that the priorities and related actions of local 
politicians may be shaped by re-elections concerns (Mayhew, 1974; Mouw and Mackuen, 1992). From this 
perspective, one cannot rule out the possibility that political proximity may translate to favorable treatment of 
constituents and firms in the home states of local politicians (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Kostovetsky, 2015). 
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If this is true, the need for discounting the issue in areas with greater political proximity should be, in fact, 
lower than otherwise. In turn, this implies that the relationship between political proximity and underpricing 
could be negative as well. As a consequence, IPOs with headquarters in areas with political proximity are 
exposed to a greater array of both threat and opportunities, thereby the net effect of political proximity on 
IPOs is theoretically ambiguous. 
Using a large and comprehensive sample of U.S. IPOs from 2000 to 2016, we document a pervasive 
impact of political proximity on IPO underpricing. Specifically, we find that PAI is significant and positively 
related to initial aftermarket returns. Economically, our results also suggest that, ceteris paribus, a shift on the 
political map from an area entirely opposed to the President to being completely aligned increases the 
average local IPO firm’s underpricing by 6.6%, which, in turn, translates to $12 million left on the table, on 
average.  
Given the adverse effect of PAI on the amount of proceeds raised by the IPO issuers, one would 
expect that these firms do not remain irresponsive, but rather they may device corporate political strategies 
that provide differential access to information throughout the legislative activity in order to mitigate the 
negative consequences of policy risk. Consistent with the view that political money contribution constitutes a 
hedging tool against policy risk (Bradley et al., 2016; Gross et al., 2016; Wellman, 2017), we demonstrate 
that underpricing is not significantly associated with policy risk for firms that either lobby or make PAC 
contributions. This implies that politically active firms are able to offset (at least in part) the negative of 
exposure to policy risk.   
To gain further insights into the link between policy risk and IPO performance, we conduct extensive 
cross-sectional tests. We, first, consider the external environment of the firm at both the industry- and the 
state-level. We find that the influence of policy risk is exacerbated for the IPOs operating in politically 
sensitive industries and weakened for IPOs with headquarters located in geographical areas characterized by 
higher values of economic freedom. As for the potential role of firm attributes, we show that the influence of 
policy risk on IPO first-day returns is more severe in hard to value firms. 
Although our results are not sensitive to alternative fixed-effect specifications and influential states, 
we reinforce the robustness of our conclusions by employing additional policy-related risk proxies. 
Consistent with our baseline results, alternative policy risk measures based on the number of bills introduced 
in Congress by home state politicians, the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) or the 
partisan conflict index of Azzimonti (2017) do not alter our main inferences. Finally, we also consider 
whether the implications of policy risk are long-lasting. IPOs originating from a state that is characterized by 
high policy risk have significantly greater return volatility for the first 12 months following the IPO. Also, 
survival and hazard models reveal that these IPOs have lower survivability rates. 
Our work contributes to the flourishing research on the impact of policy uncertainty on stock 
mispricing and the cost of financing activities, in general. Recent works have explored the effect of policy 
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risk on the equity market (Boutchkova et al., 2012; Kim et al. 2012; Pantzalis and Park, 2014; Brogaard and 
Detzel, 2015), the debt market (Francis, et al., 2014; Waisman et al., 2015; Bradley et al., 2016), as well as 
the options market (Goodell and Vähämaa, 2013; Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi, 2016). The common theme of 
these studies is that capital markets are an informative gauge of the price of political uncertainty. Our novel 
contribution to this literature is that policy risk is also priced in the IPO market. Importantly, to the extent 
that government policies aim to stimulate the economy and encourage entrepreneurial activities, the IPO 
market provides a better setting to examine the impact of policy risk, as the success of an IPO is crucial for 
ensuring the long-term prospects of young and fast growing firms, and hence for maintaining a sustainable 
and healthy growth in the aggregate economy as well (Butler et al., 2016).  
Moreover, by considering the role of policy risk we contribute to the literature on the determinants of 
IPO underpricing. Existing works in this area have studied, for instance, whether executive board 
characteristics (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Higgins and Gulati, 2006,), gatekeepers (Bedard et al., 2008; 
Benveniste and Wilhem, 2008; Chaplinsky et al., 2017), underwriters (Carter and Manaster, 1990), venture 
capitalists (Krishnan et al., 2011) and information intermediaries (Cohen and Dean, 2005; Bajo and 
Raimondo 2017) influence IPO initial pricing. Relatedly, past studies further demonstrate that IPO outcomes 
have distinct geographic characteristics related to demographics and information advantages (O’Brien and 
Tan, 2015; Nielsson and Wojcik 2016). We provide further insights by demonstrating that the impact of 
geography on IPO valuation entails a significant political dimension. 
Our paper also represents the first attempt (to our knowledge) to bring together the extant literatures 
on political uncertainty and real long-term IPO outcomes. Existing studies on seasoned firms use either 
elections (Jens, 2017) or aggregate uncertainty measures (Julio and Yook, 2012) to show that exogenous 
political shocks can be important for firm’s ongoing economic survival. In the IPO context, Çolak et al. 
(2017) focus on electoral risk at the state level, and show that gubernatorial elections dampen the local IPO 
activity (IPO volume). Although we also exploit a state level measure of policy risk, our identification 
strategy permits us to extend this study along the following dimensions. We focus on IPO mispricing 
(underpricing) and IPO delisting rates. Furthermore, by focusing on the dynamic evolution of the political 
map as it emerges from federal and state-level elections, we essentially capture the exposure of IPO issuers to 
political uncertainty beyond election cycles. In doing so, we do not only provide additional insights on the 
consequences of a charged political climate but we also analyze the interplay of electoral and policy risk, and 
hence provide a broader view of the influence of the political environment in the IPO process. Furthermore, 
we find that the impact of policy risk is not limited to the first-trading day, but rather, it has long-term 
implications, as it adversely affects the survival of IPO firms. 
Finally, this study contributes to recent discussions on the consequences of corporate political 
strategies. The extant literature argues that firms with superior access to policymakers throughout the 
legislative process have lower information asymmetry, which ultimately leads to more informed investment 
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decisions (Faccio 2006; Goldman, et al., 2008, 2009; Wu et al., 2012; Correia, 2014; Tahoun, 2014). 
However, there is limited evidence on the benefits of access to information related to policy outcomes for 
IPO issuers. A notable exception is the study Gounopoulos et al. (2017), because it finds that contributions to 
political action campaigns or lobbying activities alleviate information asymmetry problems thereby relating 
negatively to IPO first-day returns. We complement and expand this study, as we show that one particular 
motive that justifies political activism for firms conducting an IPO is the reduction of the money left on the 
table, by hedging away the exposure to local policy risk. In this respect, our findings enhance our 
understanding regarding the underlying mechanisms through which corporate political strategies may create 
value. 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 provides an overview of the sample selection procedure, while Section 4 
describes the research design. Section 5 reports the descriptive properties of our sample and the main 
empirical findings. Section 6 evaluates the robustness of our results, and Section 7 presents the long-term 
implications of PAI. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
In this section, we develop formally our hypotheses about the relationship between uncertainty 
induced by political proximity and IPO underpricing. To do so, we initially outline the theoretical 
background on why uncertainty about future government actions is relevant for asset pricing. Accordingly, 
we discuss how political proximity and policy risk are linked and how this relationship affects the pricing of 
IPOs. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Background and Empirical Challenges 
Pastor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) present a general equilibrium model for evaluating the influence 
that political uncertainty exerts on capital markets. In this framework, the authors interpret political 
uncertainty broadly as uncertainty about the government’s future actions. Further, they hypothesize that 
governments do not behave as fully benevolent social planners, because they take into account the political 
costs associated with adopting a new policy. Since these costs are typically uncertain, investors cannot fully 
anticipate which policy the government is going to implement. In addition, the uncertainty about 
government’s future actions is not fully diversifiable because it affects all firms. Therefore, political shocks 
introduced by government-induced policy changes can have a profound impact on financial markets, by 
raising discount rates and depressing asset prices. 
Consistent with the notion that political uncertainty is harmful for the economy, the extant literature 
on the intersection of political science, finance and economics provides abundant supporting evidence. What 
is perhaps, more interesting in this inquiry, is the identification of an appropriate measure of policy 
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uncertainty. For instance, Gulen and Ion (2016) and Bonaime et al. (2018) employ the aggregate text-based 
economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) and show that it adversely affects corporate 
investment and M&A activity. However, Kelly et al. (2016) note that it is difficult to distinguish the cause 
from the effect because uncertainty is countercyclical, rising sharply in recessions and falling in booms.  
To control for these confounding effects, other studies focus on electoral risk, that is, uncertainty 
surrounding political elections (Li and Born, 2006; Julio and Yook, 2012; Boutchkova et al., 2012, to name 
but a few). Elections are popular measures of political uncertainty because they are exogenous prescheduled 
events. Nonetheless, they only partially solve the uncertainty surrounding political outcomes, as economic 
agents would still not know which of the promised policies the newly elected politicians would eventually 
implement and how these policies would affect corporate outcomes (Gulen and Ion, 2016). 
 
2.2 Local Political Proximity and Policy Uncertainty 
In this study, we disentangle the causal effects of policy uncertainty by relying on the concept of local 
proximity to political power, that is, the degree of political alignment of local politicians with the ruling 
party. To do so, we focus on the US market and specifically on geographical ties at the state level between 
firms and powerful politicians. In this respect, political proximity can be regarded as the degree of political 
and ideological alignment between the President and its administration with the federal government and the 
state governments (Kim et al., 2012). Based on this reasoning, we postulate that in order for the local political 
proximity to lead to higher policy uncertainty, four conditions must be true: (1) there is a direct link between 
legislative uncertainty and political proximity; (2) local politicians must have sufficient motives to direct the 
set of preferred policies toward particular geographic areas; (3) changes to state-level policies must have a 
material impact on the business environment; and (4) policy risk associated with local political proximity is 
exogenous and cannot be fully diversified away. 
Regarding the first condition, Kim et al. (2012) argue that a major source of policy risk is uncertainty 
surrounding the legislative activity. This argument is based on the heart of the political function, as the 
process of converting policy agenda items to congressional bills involves numerous amendments or 
alterations and, of course, requires a significant amount of time for the final acceptance by a majority in both 
chambers of Congress and the President.
2
 Importantly, legislative interference results in the emergence of 
new policies, thereby leading to less predictable economic outcomes. As a result, either due to the inherent 
complexity of the legislative process or because it alters the business environment, legislative activity injects 
uncertainty into the markets. In support of this view, Malkiel (1979) and Ferguson and Witte (2006) suggest 
Congressional regulatory activity as a proxy of policy risk, since it increases return volatility and hampers 
economic performance. Also, it is interesting to note that the study of Cohen et al. (2013) shows that 
                                                             
2 As shown in the Internet Appendix (Table 3), in our sample there is a clear positive link between PAI and legislative activity, 
given that higher values of PAI are associated with more bills introduced and passed. 
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congressional bills have a significant impact on firms, though the markets seem to have a difficulty in 
assessing the impact of these bills. 
On the other hand, the capacity to shape the political agenda is a function of political partisanship. 
Fowler (2006) finds that when the executive and legislative branches in Washington are not divided (i.e., 
when the government is unified and has full control) the possibility of policy changes is higher. In this 
regard, access to political power enables policy makers to dominate the senate and house committees in 
congress and exert much greater influence sponsoring, drafting, and passing new legislation (Anderson et al., 
2003; Krutz, 2005). Combining all the above, a natural conclusion is that while greater proximity to political 
power increases legislative effectiveness, it induces policy uncertainty into the firm’s environment, as it 
facilitates policy initiatives, thereby making it harder for investors to assess what kind of policies are going to 
be adopted and what their impact will be on firm’s future prospects. 
With respect to the second condition, Mayhew (1974) and Mouw and Mackuen (1992), argue that, 
since reelection serves as the primary motivation of legislators, a greater array of policy initiatives will be 
directed towards firms and constituents of the legislators’ home states. As a consequence, the policy risk 
associated with political alignment will rise not only with the range of possible future policies but also with 
the likelihood that policy initiatives will be targeted toward specific geographic areas (Roberts, 1990; 
Jayachandran, 2006). This is particularly important given that empirical studies suggest that local political 
connections may have an impact on constituents firms’ performance. For instance, Faccio and Parsley (2009) 
document performance declines following sudden deaths dominating the firms’ home area, whereas Cohen, 
et al. (2011) show that while changes in congressional committee chairmanship  result in positive fiscal 
spending state-level shocks, they dampen corporate investment activity.
3
  
As for the final condition, it is worth noting that the U.S. political map is redrawn every 2 years 
following federal and state-level elections. The resulting changes in the political landscape serve as a 
plausible source of exogenous uncertainty because they affect all firms within each state, regardless of the 
firms’ efforts to actively seek direct political connections or not. Geographically, such political shifts induce 
dynamism in the firms’ central location, despite that it is fixed over time. This dynamism makes it more 
difficult to assess the impact of future policies across different areas and limits the ability of firms to 
diversify policy risk. 
 
 
                                                             
3 Besides the existing academic evidence, two indicative examples might illustrate why actual changes in state policies matter for 
firms. In 2011, widespread shortages labour shortages in the agriculture, hotel, construction and fishing industries were caused due 
to the enacted immigration law (HB 56) in Alabama because it punished businesses who hired illegal immigrants [How America’s 
harshest immigration law failed, MSNBC, Benjy Sarlin, December 16, 2013]. Whereas, in 2013 the dispute between Walmart and 
the District of Columbia’s City Council about the minimum wage jeopardized the viability of three stores mid-construction and the 
initiation of three additional stores [Walmart wins again as Washington D.C. mayor vetoes $12.50 minimum wage, Forbes, Janet 
Novack, September 12, 2013]. 
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2.3 Political Proximity and IPO Underpricing 
The preceding discussion suggests that the extent by which the chain of political authority that links 
federal and state governments is unbroken, the decision to invest in a firm located in an area where elected 
politicians are aligned with the President and its administration along ideological and party lines could 
directly be affected by policy risk. If this indeed is the case, one would expect that political proximity could 
undermine the firm’s ability to raise external financial capital, because investors would demand a higher 
premium in order to bear such additional risk.
4
 Consistent with this interpretation, Kim et al. (2012) show 
that firms located in states of high political proximity experience higher stock returns commensurate with 
higher political risk premium. Similarly, Bradley et al. (2016) find that the political alignment of a firms’ 
home state is positively associated with the cost of debt, whereas Gross et al. (2016) document that political 
proximity increases the opaqueness of the firms’ information environment and the volatility of future 
operating profitability. 
Extending the above reasoning to the primary equity market, we posit that uncertainty about policies 
emanating from shifts in political geography should influence the investors’ perception about the prospects of 
IPO firms as well. The IPO process is an important strategic threshold in the lifecycle of an entrepreneurial 
firm because it provides access to the resources necessary to spur its growth (Lowry et al., 2017). However, it 
is also the first time where the ownership and control of the firm is separated, increasing adverse selection 
costs arising from information asymmetry problems between managers and investors, due to the lack of 
established track records (Certo, 2003). Accordingly, information asymmetries regarding the value of assets-
in-place and growth options of IPO issuers could heighten investors’ concerns about the intrinsic value of the 
firm. 
To mitigate this problem of adverse selection, IPO issuers might offer their equity at discount. Several 
key theories of IPO pricing support this intuition and predict that an investment bank’s pricing of an offering 
should be related to the level of information asymmetry surrounding the firm (for a review, see Loughran and 
Ritter, 2004). For example, Beatty and Ritter (1986) envisage a market characterized by heterogeneously 
informed investors, i.e., both informed and uninformed investors, and predict that offer prices must be 
discounted on average, either in order to compensate for the uninformed investors’ winners curse (Rock, 
1986) or to persuade informed investors to truthfully reveal their information (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989).  
Since information asymmetry is one of the main drivers of IPO underpricing (Ljungqvist, 2007), any 
factor that exacerbates this problem should affect the investors’ perceptions about the IPO value. In this 
respect, policy uncertainty is particularly relevant because it can aggravate the associated adverse selection 
                                                             
4 The notion that political uncertainty exerts a negative financial effect on firm is supported by a series of studies on the impact of 
electoral risk on the cost of capital.  For equity related capital, Pantzalis et al. (2000) and Li and Born (2006) find abnormally high 
stock returns during periods of elevated political uncertainty, whereas Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) show that equity risk 
premium varies with political cycles. For debt-related capital, Francis et al., (2004) find that greater political uncertainty imposes 
additional costs and more stringent non-price terms on bank loan contracts. Similarly, Gao and Qi (2013) show that municipal 
bonds yields rise around U.S. gubernatorial elections. 
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costs. This could happen because exposure to policy risk deteriorates the firm’s economic environment, 
making it more volatile and less transparent, reducing the effectiveness of external monitoring and creating 
incentives or opportunities for managers to engage in suboptimal behavior.  
Rational investors are likely to anticipate these potential agency problems, especially for firms for 
which policy uncertainty is prevalent in their domiciled states. Accordingly, they will price-protect 
themselves by demanding a higher compensation for bearing such risk (Michaely and Shaw, 1994). This will 
be reflected in a greater cost of equity capital and lower offer prices, leading thus, to higher IPO 
underpricing. These observations yield our main hypothesis:  
 
Policy Exposure Hypothesis: Policy risk emanating from higher political proximity exacerbates adverse 
selection problems associated with information asymmetry and thus leads to greater IPO underpricing. 
 
On the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility that political alignment can also have welfare 
implications. In fact, this conjecture is motivated by studies that regard politicians as vote-plurality 
maximizers. These studies model the importance of the President and its cabinet in shaping economic 
policies and find that government spending is allocated based on geographic importance (Downs, 1957; 
Tullock, 1976; Johnston, 1977, 1980). In a similar vein, the “loyal voter” theories assert that parties allocate a 
disproportionate amount of resources (government spending projects and programs) to electoral areas that 
benefit their supporters (Kramer, 1966; Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006).  
Consequently, it would not be unexpected to find that political proximity can be reflected in a more 
lenient treatment to electorally important firms (Heese, 2015). Not surprisingly, some empirical evidence 
confirms that this inclination was evident in the case of government bailouts during the 2008 financial crisis, 
where geopolitical ties influenced the allocation of assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(Duchin and Soyura, 2012; Kostovetsky, 2015). Based on this reasoning, we anticipate that IPO firms located 
in areas with strong control of the ruling party might be able to gain additional benefits in the form of 
enhanced growth opportunities or competitive advantages, both of which imply lower discounting. This 
discussion yields our alternative hypothesis: 
 
Favorable Treatment Hypothesis: Political favoritism stemming from greater political proximity leads to 
higher and more certain future payoffs, thereby mitigating adverse selection costs associated with 
information asymmetry and IPO underpricing. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Methodology 
Our sample selection starts with retrieving all initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2000 and 2016 
from the U.S. Common Stock Data File of Securities Data Company (SDC) database. Consistent with the 
12 
 
literature (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004), we apply standard IPO filters to exclude foreign issues, unit 
offerings, reverse LBOs, spinoffs, closed end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITS), royalty trusts, 
financial institutions, limited partnerships, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), as well as all IPOs with 
an offer price below $5.00. We obtain IPO background and issuance information from the SDC, including 
the issue data, offer price, total proceeds raised, whether the firm is backed by venture capital and the 
prestige of underwriters. For underwriter prestige ranking, the study employs Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) 
measures of underwriter quality.  
We also utilize IPO prospectuses from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s EDGAR in 
order to assign firms to geographic location (states or regions) based on headquarter or home office address 
information. Accounting data are retrieved from the Compustat database, and public trading prices are 
obtained from the Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP). After merging the IPO data with the 
corresponding accounting and stock market information and eliminating observations with missing values, 
we end up with 1,639 IPO firms. 
Data regarding the external political environment are collected from various sources depending on the 
type of election. Starting from the state where the firm’s headquarters is located, we gather state-level 
elections results from different volumes of Taylor’s Encyclopedia of Government Officials: Federal and State 
Elective Officials to identify the party affiliation of the majority of a state’s legislative body. Results for 
gubernatorial and congressional elections are obtained from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections 
(http://uselectionatlas.org). Election results for the U.S. House of Representatives were extracted from the 
website of the Office of the Clerk (http://clerk.house.org). Where necessary, information about the majority 
in both chambers of the Congress were complemented by the Biographical Directory of the United States 
Congress (http://bioguide.congress.gov). Finally, state-level data, such as real GDP growth rate, personal 
income, and unemployment rate are extracted from the Regional Economic Accounts Database provided by 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Measuring Proximity to Political Power 
In this study, we employ the Political Alignment Index (PAI) proposed by Kim et al. (2012) to 
measure the access of local firms to the center of political power (i.e., Washington, D.C.). PAI measures a 
firms’ proximity to political power as it reflects the percentage of state’s representatives in the Senate and 
House chambers of the Congress that belong to the President’s party as well as the degree to which the 
presidential party controls the states’ political institutions (i.e., the governorship and state legislature). It is a 
state-year variable, and in its main form, it is calculated by assigning equal weight to the portions of each of 
the state’s delegations in the two chambers of the Congress that are aligned with the ruling party and the 
president’s party control of the states’ political institutions, as follows: 
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where Senators is the percentage of the state’s two senators in the U.S. Senate that belong to the President’s 
party. Representatives is the fraction of the state’s House representatives in Washington that belong to the 
President’s party. Governor is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the governor belongs to the 
same party as the President, and zero otherwise. State Senators is a dummy variable equal to one if more than 
50% of the state senate belong to the President’s party, and zero otherwise. State Representatives is a dummy 
variable equal to one if more than 50% of the state house belong to the President’s party, and zero otherwise.  
To evaluate the robustness of the PAI effect, we consider alternative measures of proximity to 
political power. Following Antia et al. (2013) and Kim el al. (2012) we experiment with two PAI variants by 
dropping the state’s legislatures components (ModifiedPAI 1) and the state governors component 
(ModifiedPAI 2) and assigning equal weights to the remaining components: 
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Since the value of PAI changes every two years, an alternative modelling strategy that may better 
captures the causal effect of shifts in the political landscape, is to investigate how changes of PAI instead of 
the level of PAI affect IPO initial returns. In this case, the variable of interest is the annual change of PAI for 
every state, namely, ΔPAI. Finally, we consider a much broader PAI definition that accounts for geographic 
regions’ instead of states’ political alignment with the President and its administration (Regional PAI). In 
doing so, we classify states into four regions (West, Midwest, South, and Northeast) and average the PAI 
values across all states in each region.
5
  
 
4.2 Empirical Model 
The major focus of this study is to estimate the relation between proximity to political power and IPO 
underpricing. We test this relation between policy risk and initial returns to investors using multivariate 
methods controlling for firm, IPO and state characteristics. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) models and 
cluster standard errors at the state-level. We also include industry, state, and year fixed effects to mitigate 
omitted variable bias problem.  In accordance with our developed hypothesis, our model takes the following 
form: 
                                                             
5 West includes AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY; Midwest includes IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MB, MO, ND, 
NE, OH,SD, WI; South includes AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV; and Northeast 
includes  CT, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT. 
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                                                           (4) 
Our dependent variable is underpricing. The main variable of interest is the political alignment index 
(PAI) and is used as our main proxy of policy risk. We expect PAI to be positively related to underpricing if 
local policy uncertainty exacerbates the adverse selection problem. Alternatively, PAI should reduce initial 
IPO returns if proximity to political powers enhances an average firm’s growth opportunities or reduces 
information asymmetry problems.   
In addition, we control for offering and company characteristics that prior literature identifies as 
potential determinants of underpricing. We use firm age as a surrogate for risk. The underlying assumption is 
that firms with longer operations have proven their dynamism against the changes of the market and thus 
constitute safer investments (Carter et al., 1998). We use total proceeds at the time of listing as a proxy for 
firm size and visibility. We expect that firms with higher IPO proceeds exhibit less underpricing, consistent 
with the idea that large firms suffer less from information uncertainty problems than small firms. However, 
Gounopoulos et al. (2017) show that firms with higher IPO proceeds may be more underpriced.  
Dolvin and Jordan (2008) suggest that the increased proportion of shares held by managers, namely, 
overhang is positively associated with high levels of underpricing. Also, Loughran and Ritter (2002) use 
market return as a measure of investor sentiment and document that it is a positively related with IPO initial 
returns. Moreover, Lee and Wahal (2004) argue that while financial intermediaries, such as underwriters and 
venture capitalists (VCs) play a certification role in the IPO process, they also have strong incentives to 
improve the first-day returns for the new shareholders. To account for the role of these intermediaries, we 
control for the reputation of the underwriter and the presence of venture capitalists.  
Following Gounopoulos et al. (2017) we include earnings per share (EPS) in order to capture the 
influence of profitability tendencies in the year trailing to the IPO on underpricing. Also, prior studies show 
that immediate aftermarket returns depend on the level and nature of riskiness of the firm’s external operating 
environment (e.g., Loughran, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). To this end, we consider whether IPO firms 
were in the Internet and Technology sector or incorporated in Nasdaq. Besides typical company 
characteristics, we also control for GDP growth rate, personal income and unemployment rate at the state 
level, since exposure to policy risk may be partially determined by the state’s economic fundamentals 
(Bradley et al., 2016; Çolak et al., 2017). 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 presents the distributional statistics for the IPO activity, underpricing and the political 
alignment index. Panel A of Table 1 focuses on the time-series dimension, while Panel B reports how these 
measures vary across industries. An inspection at Panel A reveals that the number of IPOs and the level of 
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underpricing tend to decrease after stock market and/or economic crises, as indicated by the Dot-com bubble 
and the Credit crunch in 2000 and 2007, respectively. An explanation of this behavior lies in the sensitivity of 
the investor sentiment to economic shocks (Lee et al., 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 2004) and the so-called 
“strategic waiting” phenomenon (Çolak and Gunay, 2011), both of which affect the timing of IPOs. In 
contract, PAI exhibits a rather consistent behavior over time, except in the year of the Dot-com bubble burst 
(2001) and the years surrounding the Credit crunch (2007-2008).   
Panel B of Table 1 classifies IPO firms in sectors and reveals a relatively high concentration in the 
chemical products, computer equipment and services sectors. The food products and entertainment services 
sectors have the lowest representation of IPO firms. Consistent with the IPO literature (e.g., Ritter and 
Welch, 2002), technology firms, such as those operating in the computer sector, are more risky, and as a 
consequence, they experience higher underpricing than firms operating in less opaque environments, such as 
utility firms. Thus, as IPO first-day returns vary across both industries and time, it is essential to control for 
unobservable industry and time effects in our regressions. Regarding the values of PAI, it is interesting to 
mention that, the largest values can be found in chemical and manufacturing industries, whereas the lowest 
values are in the entertainment sector. Panel C presents the means of PAI, underpricing and IPO activity by 
state. Firms headquartered in 4 states (California, Texas, Massachusetts, and New York) represent around the 
one half of our sample. Also, there is considerable variation in PAI and underpricing across states.
6
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of PAI and IPO initial aftermarket returns. Panel A suggests 
that PAI is higher during Republican presidencies, with a mean value of 0.51 over the 0.45 of Democratic 
presidencies. Panel B indicates that the average first-day returns are higher during Democratic presidencies, 
which accords with the asset pricing tests of Kim et al. (2012). Panel C presents the average PAI in the home 
states of the Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Speakers of the U.S. House of Representatives. Consistent with 
the notion of proximity to political power, the home states of Presidents and Vice Presidents have greater PAI 
than the home states of Speakers. An exception, however, is the home state of Barak Obama which ranks 
lower to the home state of its Vice President (Joe Biden) in the same period.  
Table 3 shows the mean values of firm fundamentals and state-level characteristics for firms located 
in states with low and high PAI, respectively. Panel A clearly indicates that firms with headquarters in states 
with high proximity to political tend to experience higher levels of IPO first-day returns, providing thus, 
preliminary support to our main hypothesis. Panel B further elaborates on this issue by providing illustrating 
examples of how IPO underpricing varies in states with low and high proximity to political power. For 
instance, Linkedin had an underpricing of 109.44% and operates in California, which is a state with very high 
PAI (0.91). On the other hand, Dov Pharmaceutical experienced a negative underpricing of -21.50% (i.e., 
overpricing) and operates in New Jersey, which is a state with a relatively low value of average PAI (0.12).
7
  
                                                             
6 Figure 1 in the Appendix further illustrates how the average PAI varies across states. 
7 See Table 4 in Internet Appendix. 
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As for the remaining firm characteristics, we find that the IPO issuers located in states with high PAI 
are younger and have more financial leverage, compared to firms in states with low PAI. However, the 
former firms have higher proceeds from the offering and are less profitable. Interestingly, these firms are 
regarded as risky because they operate in the internet and technology sector, and have more reputable 
underwriters and venture-backing than low PAI firms. Lastly, Panel B indicates that in states with high 
proximity to powerful politicians GDP growth rate, personal income and unemployment rate are higher than 
otherwise.  
 
5. 2 Multivariate Regressions 
5.2.1 The Effect of Political Alignment Index (PAI) on IPO First-Day Returns 
Table 4 presents the results of our OLS regression tests on the association between the political 
alignment index and IPO underpricing. Column (1) displays the results for PAI. Columns (2) and (3) consider 
two variants of PAI, while Column (4) presents the results for the regional PAI.  
Column (1) documents a strong and significant positive relation between PAI and initial aftermarket 
returns, suggesting that, after controlling for firm-specific and state-level economic factors, PAI tends to 
increase IPO first-day returns. This is a sizeable effect in economic terms; a unit increase of the PAI score 
(i.e., a shift on the political map from an area completely opposed to the president to being completely 
aligned) increases the average local IPO firm’s underpricing by 6.6%, which, in turn, translates to $12 
million left on the table. Similar conclusion can be obtained by looking the coefficients of the PAI variants 
and the regional PAI. Overall, the results from columns (1)-(4) are supportive of the policy exposure 
hypothesis and consistent with the notion that the information environment of an average local firm 
deteriorates when its state’s position on the political map shifts toward the centers of political power. 
The findings pertaining to the control variables are interesting in their own right. The coefficient on 
age is positive but insignificant, which contradicts with the notion that long-lived companies have lower 
uncertainty. Similarly, leverage and EPS tend to increase initial returns to investors, however, their 
coefficient is indistinguishable from zero. Likewise, the coefficient on proceeds raised is positive but 
marginally significant. Since size should presumably lead to less, rather than more underpricing, this may 
reflect the need to attract more uninformed investors via a discount. We obtain a positive and highly 
significant coefficient on overhang, which is in line with Dolvin and Jordan (2008). Consistent with 
Loughran and Ritter (2004), we report that the underwriters as well as the venture capitalists contribute 
positively to immediate aftermarket returns. Also, technology stocks tend to have higher underpricing, 
whereas internet stocks’ underpricing is not significantly different from rest of the sample. We obtain a 
positive and highly significant coefficient on market return, which is consistent with Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). Finally, the coefficients of the state-level variables do not significantly relate to underpricing. 
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5.2.2 Do IPO Firms Hedge Policy Risk by Engaging in Active Political Strategies? 
Having established that PAI is positively associated with IPO initial returns, it is natural to ask how 
political alignment – as a source of policy risk – is related with corporate political activism. It is well-
documented that firms adopt active corporate political strategies in order to establish political connections, so 
that they can reap private benefits. These connections often take the form of adding politicians to the board of 
directors (Goldman et al., 2008, 2009), financial contributions to election campaigns and lobbying 
expenditures (Correia, 2014), top management’s past service in the government or military positions (Wu et 
al., 2012), and equity ownership by influential politicians (Faccio 2006; Tahoun, 2014). While these 
corporate political strategies vary in terms of nature and effectiveness, they aim to establish a direct 
relationship between firms and policy maker that brings preferential political treatment and gives more 
information on the legislative process.  
 With respect to the uncertainty emanating from political proximity, Antia et al. (2013) find that firms 
use political strategies to lower local policy risk, as they adjust their lobbying expenditures in reaction to 
changes in political geography. Bradley et al. (2016) document that local political proximity increases the 
cost of debt, but only for firms not engaging in lobbying and/contribution to PACs, whereas Gross et al. 
(2016) document that policy risk exerts a significant influence on financial reporting choices and the firm’s 
information environment when firms are not politically active. Similarly, Wellman (2017) finds that political 
connections (partially) offset the negative relation between investment and political uncertainty.  
Therefore, from a resource perspective, corporate political strategies can be viewed as an intangible 
asset, a source of political intelligence that enhances firms’ ability to better time its responses to political 
developments (Amore and Minichilli, 2018). If indeed the market regards this form of political capital as an 
indication of a firm’s capability to deal with the complexities of the political system, this form of political 
activism should also mitigate to some extent the information asymmetries in IPOs. Gounopoulos et al. (2017) 
support this view as they show politically active IPO firms experience lower underpricing. Building on this 
study, we further hypothesize that the underlying mechanism driving the relationship between underpricing 
and political donations is the degree of exposure to policy risk. As a consequence, we posit IPO issuers stand 
to ultimately gain from corporate political strategies because these courses of action decrease the exposure to 
policy risk. 
We put this hedging hypothesis to test by looking whether companies engage in political money 
contributions (i.e., if firms either lobby or make PAC contributions, PMC=1) or not (PMC=0). Then, we 
examine if political money contributions (PMC) can effectively protect IPO firms from policy risk by 
performing OLS regressions in the PMC and non-PMC subsamples, respectively.
8
 As expected, Panel A of 
                                                             
8 Data regarding the lobbying activities and PAC contributions are carefully hand collected from OpenSecrets. Our lobbying and 
PAC sample covers a 17-year period from January 2000 to December 2016. When we match our IPO sample with the 
OpenSecrests database, we identify 158 firms with lobbying experience and 53 PAC-active IPOs. Additionally, the number of 
firms with political money contributions (PMC) is 181. See Internet Appendix for more information about the distribution of PMC. 
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Table 5 shows that the association between policy risk and IPO underpricing is not statistically significant if 
firms actively pursue political strategies, while the influence of policy risk on underpricing is strengthened in 
the absence of political money contributions. 
However, a potential problem with these results is sample selection bias. Among others, Gounopoulos 
et al. (2017) document that the decision to engage in political actions is not random, but rather, it is more 
likely to be related with the factors reflecting the resource availability of firms as well as the external 
environment. In this case, the standard errors in the models previously estimated could be biased, that is, 
overstated or understated because firms tend to self-select to participate in political activities. Since, in our 
sample only 11% of the IPO firms engage in political money contributions, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that our inferences are subject to concerns related to potential selection bias. 
To alleviate these concerns, we follow two distinct strategies. First, we use the propensity score 
matching (PSM) procedure. Our identification strategy is to reduce the bias by comparing the PAI effect on 
underpricing (outcome) between firms that are comparable only in array of factors except political money 
contributions. To obtain the closest equivalent for each politically active firm (treatment group), we run a 
logistic model with a set of covariates that may affect the likelihood of engaging in corporate political 
strategies and match non-PMC firm (control group) to each PMC firm (treatment group) on a one-to-one 
basis based on the estimated propensity score.
9
 Using this procedure, we are able to identify a sufficiently 
close match for 149 of our treatment observations (out of 181), resulting in a sample comprising of 298 
treatment and control observations. We then re-test our hedging hypothesis in the treatment and matched 
subsample, respectively. Our results in Table 5, confirm that the relation between PAI and IPO underpricing 
is significant only for firms that do not engage in political money contributions. 
Lastly, we attempt to control for self-selection bias in an alternative way by utilizing the two-stage 
Heckman (1979) procedure. In doing so, we initially run a logistic regression where the dependent variable is 
PMC and the independent variables are the same as in the PSM methodology. Then, we save the residuals 
from this logistic regression and construct the Inverse of Mills Ratio for PMC. In the second-stage model we 
include the Inverse of Mills Ratio in the main model for IPO first-day returns and report the results of the 
OLS regressions in columns (3) and (4) of Panel B (Table 5).  
As shown by column (3), the positive coefficient of the Inverse Mills Ratio suggests that ignoring a 
firm’s unobservable characteristics that affect propensity to participate in political actions would result in 
overestimating the impact of PAI on underpricing. Nonetheless, the coefficient of PAI for PMC firms 
remains insignificant. With respect to non-PMC firms, the insignificant Inverse Mills ratio in column (3) 
indicates that selection bias for non-PMC firms does not seem to be a concern, whereas the PAI effect on 
underpricing remains positive and highly significant. Overall, the results from the models that account for 
                                                             
9 To allow for a better match between connected and non-connected firms we include all covariates from the baseline regression.  
Also, to identify the firms that provide the closest match, we perform the nearest neighbor matching method for firms in the same 
year. 
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sample selection bias using the Heckman’s procedure are still supportive of the policy exposure hypothesis 
and consistent with the notion that direct political connections either in the form of PAC contributions or 
lobbying expenditures mitigate the effects of policy risk on underpricing. 
 
6.  Robustness Analyses 
The results thus far, show that political proximity is positively associated with initial (IPO) 
aftermarket returns, which is consistent with the hypothesis that political proximity leads to higher policy 
risk. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that firms pursue active political strategies in order to hedge 
policy risk emanating from local political proximity. Otherwise, political alignment should play a role in 
delivering political favors, and hence we would expect to find a significant negative relation between PAI 
and IPO underpricing, especially for firms pursuing corporate political strategies. 
In this section, we aim to gain additional insights into the PAI effect and to further establish the 
direction of causality by conducting a series of additional tests. We begin our analysis by examining whether 
the impact of the policy risk is a function of the infrastructure of states, industries and firms, respectively. 
Finally, we corroborate the robustness of our baseline results by employing alternative proxies for policy risk 
and by considering their sensitivity to various industry specifications. 
 
6.1 Industry and State Infrastructure 
To examine whether and how industry characteristics exacerbate or attenuate the positive effect of 
PAI on IPO underpricing, we consider the sensitivity to political uncertainty at the industry level. Julio and 
Yook (2012) and Jens (2017) show that the negative effect of political risk on firm investment is stronger in 
politically sensitive industries. Boutchkova et al. (2012) further demonstrate that equity return volatility is 
stronger in industries that are sensitive to political shocks. We extend this line of reasoning by stating that the 
PAI effect on IPO valuation is pronounced for firms operating in politically sensitive industries, since these 
firms are more likely to experience regulatory changes, and hence greater policy uncertainty (Kostovetsky, 
2015).
10
 
With respect to the state infrastructure, it is well-documented that government intervention is more 
severe for firms that are subject to weak institutional constraints (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1998). 
Extending this reasoning, we posit that if government intervention in the form of regulatory initiatives- 
injects uncertainty into the business environment, the ability of politicians to (adversely) affect the economic 
environment should be diminished in areas with higher institutional quality. To operationalize institutional 
                                                             
10 Following, Herron et al. (1999) we define firms operating in Tobacco Products, Pharmaceuticals, HealthCare Services, Defense, 
Petroleum and Natural Gas, Telecommunications and Transportation industries as politically sensitive, whereas the identification is 
based on the Fama French 48 industry classification scheme. We then create a dummy variable which is equal to one for firms that 
belong to one of the politically sensitive industries. 
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quality, we use the state economic freedom index from the Fraser Institute.
11
 The index is constructed to 
capture three main elements: the size of government of a particular state, discriminatory taxation, and 
regulation. By definition, a higher degree of economic freedom is inversely related with the size, and 
regulatory intervention of local governments, which, in turn implies a lower ability of politicians to shape the 
broader environment in which the firm operates. In light of this, higher values of economic freedom translate 
to lower policy risk, and hence, a weakened positive impact of PAI on IPO initial returns. 
Table 6 presents our findings on the mediating role of industry and state factors. Specification (1) 
indicates that the PAI effect on underpricing is stronger when firms operate in politically sensitive industries, 
whereas specification (2) demonstrates that in states characterized by high institutional quality the 
relationship between policy risk and initial aftermarket returns is weakened. 
 
6.2 Firm Characteristics 
We now turn our attention on whether the effect of PAI on underpricing varies with firm 
characteristics related to information asymmetry problems. In particular, we investigate whether the effect of 
political alignment on IPO initial returns varies across firms in terms of business models, maturity, and 
agency problems.  
Prior studies show that technology firms differ substantially from other firms, since they operate in 
less established industries and are subject to an inherently higher degree of uncertainty (Schenone, 2005). 
Also, they face higher failure rates due to huge organizational costs of commercializing high complexity 
technologies (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Similarly, younger firms are less visible, have shorter track records 
and less developed administrative capabilities than more established firms (Lowry and Murphy, 2007). Since 
policy risk worsens information asymmetry problems, we expect that the PAI effect on underpricing is 
pronounced in technology and younger firms. 
Finally, to proxy for agency problems we utilize the magnitude of free cash flows. Mishra (2014) 
argues that firms with high cash flow are likely to have the most serious agency problems, whereas firms 
with low cash flow are likely to have the least severe agency problems. Since, agency conflicts exacerbate 
information risk and adversely affect the firm’s ability to handle increased uncertainty, we anticipate that the 
influence of local policy risk is stronger in firms with agency conflicts. 
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 7 show that the impact of PAI is pronounced among technology and 
younger firms, which is consistent with the notion that the adverse effect of uncertainty is strengthened 
among hard-to-value firms. In a similar spirit, columns (5) to (6) reveal that the positive influence of policy 
risk on underpricing is also driven by agency issues in manner consistent with our prediction.    
 
 
 
                                                             
11 We extract historical information on state economic freedom from the Fraser Institute (http://www.freetheworld.com). 
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6.3 Alternative Ways to Measure Policy Risk  
Throughout our analysis, we resorted to the political alignment index developed by Kim et al. (2012) 
as our main proxy of policy risk. In this section, we further evaluate our main hypothesis using alternative 
indicators related to legislative activity. We initially consider the number of bills introduced in Congress by 
home state politicians for a given year (BilNum). Kim et al. (2012) argue that while the legislative efforts of 
influential politicians are mainly directed toward their home constituents, the legislative process, i.e., bill 
passing, is typically lengthy, generating thus, policy uncertainty. Further, we acknowledge that the legislative 
activity may be driven by factors that extend the boundaries of a particular state. The monthly economic 
policy uncertainty index (EPU) constructed by Baker et al. (2016) is a national index, thereby reflecting 
broader economic forces that shape the administration’s policy agenda.12 Following Bradley et al. (2016), we 
employ PolRisk1 replacing PAI with BilNum and PolRisk2 and PolRisk3 by multiplying PAI with EPU and 
BilNum, respectively, in an attempt to capture the overlapping effects of the two location-specific measures 
(PAI and BilNum) and the broader economic policy uncertainty index.  
Although heightened economic uncertainty is a prevalent characteristic over the last decade, policy 
uncertainty shocks could also arise from partisan conflicts. Azzimonti (2017) defines partisan conflicts as the 
political disagreement between policy makers (either across party lines or within a party). Accordingly, the 
author notes that a higher degree of partisan conflicts will lead to more policy uncertainty because it 
negatively affects the optimal response to adverse shocks and the quality of policy reforms aimed at 
preventing them. In this regard, it is natural to assume that when the degree of partisan conflict is high, the 
firm’s information environment deteriorates and the investors’ demand for risky investments weakens, 
thereby leading to higher IPO underpricing. To test this hypothesis, we employ PolRisk4, which is the 
monthly level of the Partisan Conflict Index (PCI), as constructed by Azzimonti (2017).
13
 We also consider 
PolRisk5, which is the PAI index multiplied by the PCI, in order to incorporate the overlapping state and 
country-wide effects of the PAI measure and the PCI measure, respectively. 
Table 8 presents the results of these four alternative policy risk measures on IPO returns. The 
evidence is consistent with the baseline results. All five measures are positive and significant in predicting 
variation on IPO underpricing, providing further support to the idea that policy risk is priced in the IPO 
market. 
 
6.4 Industry and State Fixed Effects 
Finally, we evaluate the robustness of our results by considering their sensitivity to various industry 
specifications. To do so, in Table 9 we repeat the baseline regression using alternative definitions of industry 
fixed effects (i.e., Fama French 17 and Fama-French 30). Moreover, in untabulated results, we selectively 
                                                             
12 The data for the EPU index can be accessed at http://www.policyuncertainty.com. 
13 The data for the PCI is obtained from the Real-time Data Research Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
(https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/partisan-conflict-index). 
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drop industries from our main results in order to assess the possibility that our results are driven by one or 
more industries. After re-estimating the basic equation and sequentially dropping each industry from the 
regression, our inferences remain unaltered. In the last two columns of Panel A (Table 9), we compare our 
results by excluding the industry- and state- fixed effects. We obtained similar evidence across all 
specifications, which indicates that the PAI effect on underpricing is not (at least significantly) influenced by 
unobservable industry- or state-specific factors.  
 
6.4.1 Influential States 
As a last robustness check, we attempt to assure that our results are not driven by influential states. 
Given that the 15 (the first tercile) most active states based on IPO volume constitute more than one half of 
our IPO sample (see Panel D of Table 1), it is possible that our main inferences are driven by a dominant 
state. By removing each of these states (one at a time) from the sample, we find that the results are 
qualitatively the same. For brevity, in Panel B of Table 9 we report only the results for three states with the 
high and the lowest PAI, respectively. We also repeat the same process for the states with the lowest number 
of IPOs. In unreported tests we find that our results remain robust (they actually become stronger) when 
using these subsamples. 
 
7.  Post-IPO Outcomes 
7.1 PAI Effect on Secondary Market Volatility 
Our central hypothesis is that political proximity proxies for the ex-ante policy-related uncertainty 
about the IPO’s valuation. In line with this intuition, we find that political proximity is associated with higher 
underpricing. This finding is also consistent with a number of theories predicting that underpricing represents 
an attempt of the investment bankers and issuers to compensate investors for the greater costs of becoming 
informed (Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986), and as such, it constitutes an efficient response to the 
complexity of the valuation problem (Ritter, 1984; Welch, 1992).  
An interesting aspect of this process, though, is that it enables issuers to mitigate the information 
asymmetry problem about the markets’ aggregate demand for the firms’ shares. As Lowry et al. (2010) note, 
the initiation of trading facilitates the incorporation of all market participants’ information into the price and 
hence helps issuers and underwriters to more precisely estimate the clearing price. This mechanism 
highlights underwriters’ difficulty in valuing companies characterized by high uncertainty; yet, in our 
context, it does not necessarily result in the elimination of the investor’s policy-related adverse selection 
costs. One reason for this is that in order to minimize the money left on the table, corporate insiders may not 
accurately reveal their superior (private) information on how future government actions may affect the 
prospects of their firm, especially in areas exposed to greater policy risk. Another non-mutually exclusive 
explanation is that the time of the IPO immediate aftermarket prices are not fully informative because both 
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investors and firm are not particularly knowledgeable about the nature, timing, and impact of future 
government actions. 
Based on this reasoning, we anticipate that as long as political proximity is associated with possible 
future policy changes, it will adversely affect the precision of the price-setting process beyond the first-
trading day (Yung et al., 2008). To test this conjecture we explore the extent to which the PAI effect is 
associated with the persistence in the volatility of secondary stock returns.
14
  
Panel A of Table 10 demonstrates that both the total return volatility and idiosyncratic volatility is 
higher for firms with greater political proximity. The differences between the low and high PAI regimes are 
significant up to 504 days (2 years), which is consistent with the notion that investors indeed need some time 
to observe the post-IPO effect of policy changes on firms. Also, it is interesting to note that the exposure to 
greater idiosyncratic volatility in the post-IPO period is accordance with the idea that the returns of high PAI 
firms reflect greater private information. Nonetheless, to investigate more rigorously the link between PAI 
and post-IPO return dispersion we repeat the baseline regression with the post-IPO volatility measures as the 
dependent variable instead of underpricing. The results in Panel B reveal a similar PAI affect after 
controlling for other potential determinants; however, in this multivariate setting PAI, does not seem be 
reliably associated with greater uncertainty about the price of the IPO stock after the first year. 
 
7.2 PAI Effect on Real Investment Decisions 
The analysis so far, demonstrates that as any form of uncertainty, uncertainty emanating from greater 
political proximity increases the risk of holding financial claims in firms’ assets. Nevertheless, besides the 
well-documented financial effects, extensive prior evidence suggests that policy uncertainty has also real 
investment implications (see, for instance, Gulen and Ion, 2016; Çolak et al., 2017; Jen, 2017). Particularly, 
the higher discount rate associated with policy uncertainty reduces the net present value of investment 
projects, inducing firms to underinvest. Another layer of uncertainty, however, is added in the presence of 
investment irreversibility. In this case two scenarios are possible. In the anticipation of possible negative 
shocks, firms will delay investment in order to limit the exposure to downside risk. However, even if positive 
policy changes are about to take place, firms have still incentive to delay an investment, since the expected 
policy outcome could heterogeneously affect the attractiveness of different investment opportunities, thereby 
distorting the allocation of spending across alternative investment opportunities (Julio and Yook, 2012). 
 Therefore, either due to higher discount rate or investment irreversibility, firms located in areas with 
high PAI areas may find it optimal to reduce investment expenditures until the associated uncertainty is 
                                                             
14 There are important considerations in selecting the appropriate return horizon. Particularly, the relevance of the entrepreneur’s ex 
ante private information or the uncertainty about the government’s future actions – the relevant imperfections in our setting – is 
probably limited at very long horizons. As a compromise, we present our results over 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, 12-
months, 24-months, and 36-months. Given that new elected politicians usually reveal their intentions in the first months of their 
tenure and that PAI changes every two years, these periods are sufficiently long to allow for a significant amount of policy-related 
information to enter into the market price. 
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resolved. We investigate the validity of this conclusion by focusing on the nature of the relationship between 
PAI and accounting-based investment measures at the IPO year. To do so, we employ the baseline model 
(column 2 of Table 11) expect with capital expenditures (CAPEX) and R&D expenditures as the dependent 
variable instead of underpricing. As shown in Table 11, the coefficient of PAI is negative and significant 
across all specifications. This result reinforces our main hypothesis that firms located in areas of the political 
map that are tightly related with the President face higher uncertainty.
15
 
 
7.3 Long-Term Implications of PAI 
Our final test is concerned with the long-term implications of policy risk on IPOs. Previously we 
found that PAI undermines the ability of IPO issuers to raise capital, distorts the post-IPO information 
environment, and disrupts the firm’s regularly planned investment activities. Although our analysis and the 
very nature of the PAI measure are suggestive of an influence that does not exceed the period of two years, it 
should be noted that the cash raised through an IPO can be a critical asset for a strategy of growth, and as 
such, it can have an enduring effect on the firms’ ability to grow and capitalize future investment 
opportunities. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that PAI adversely affects the ability of a firm to 
operate as independent organization, i.e., to be acquired, if it faces financial problems. Similarly, one can 
argue that political proximity can have even more severe long-term implications if it impedes the firms’ 
ability to meet listing exchange requirements or increases the chances of liquidation.
16
 
To test this conjecture, we investigate whether PAI affects the incidence of delisting, that is, the 
survivability of IPO issuers, which is arguably the ultimate performance measure (Welbourne and Andrews, 
1996; Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005). Following the convention in the literature, we assess the survivability 
of IPO issuers by using survival and hazard functions (Jain and Kini, 2000; Alhadab et al., 2014; 
Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017). To do so, we initially perform the Cox (1972) proportional hazard analysis as 
well as the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) method. The selection of the Cox and AFT models over ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and binary dependent models is justified by the fact that IPO data are right censored, as 
many firms that went public are still trading (Demers and Joos, 2007). Additionally, they allow us to take 
into account the length of time that a company survives.
17
 In the Cox model, the dependent variable is failure 
risk and takes the value of 1 if the firm is delisted within five years after its IPO, while in the AFT model the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the survival time which is measured in months. 
  Table 12 reports the results of the survival analysis.  Column (1) assesses the impact of PAI using the 
Cox model and documents a strong and significant positive coefficient on Political Alignment. Particularly, it 
                                                             
15
 Our sample reduces because R&D and CAPEX are available for only 1,183 firms. 
16
 Delisting due to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) does not necessarily represent failure because a firm may become a target due 
its unique competitive advantages. Given this ambiguity, we also classified as M&A related delistings in the failed-IPO sample 
only if the targets were considered as low-quality firms in the year prior to their acquisition (Fama and French, 2004). This 
approach did not alter our inferences about the relationship between PAI and IPO survival. 
17 It should be noted that the time horizon that we examine the survivorship of each firm after its issuance is five years. Therefore, 
our sample-period spans from 2000 to 2012. 
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shows that a unit increase of the PAI score (i.e., a shift on the political map from an area completely opposed 
to the president to being completely aligned) increases the failure risk by 52%. Column (2) assesses the 
impact of PAI using the AFT method and suggests a shorter time to survive in the periods following the 
offering for firms operating in states with high PAI. Specifically, the coefficient on PAI is -0.45, which 
suggests that a unit increase in the PAI score causes the survival time of the average firm to decrease by 
36.23% [=exp(-0.45)*1-1]. In turn, this equates to a reduction in the survival time from 90.82 months (7.87 
years) to 57.91 months (4.82 years). In short, we confirm our prediction that IPOs originating from a state 
that is characterized by high policy risk face a higher probability of failure.  
  
8.  Conclusion 
This paper documents that proximity to political power tends to be positively associated with 
underpricing. Since politicians from areas offering high political alignment with the Presidential party are 
better positioned to influence the political agenda and lead legislative initiatives, we view political proximity 
as a major source of policy risk. We also examine the role of political connections established either through 
financial contributions to PACs or lobbying activities, and find that these strategies act as effective tools for 
hedging policy risk. Politically sensitive industries amplify the impact of policy risk, whereas the strength of 
the PAI-underpricing link is weakened in states of high economic freedom. The relationship between PAI 
and IPO first-day returns is not uniform across firms. Rather, it depends on the type of business model, 
maturity, and the degree of agency conflicts. The results are robust to various specifications and alternative 
measures of policy risk. Finally, the influence of PAI extends to the post-IPO market, discourages corporate 
investments, and reduces the survivability of the IPO issuers. 
Arguably, the IPO market is considered as a critical economic and financial asset. However, our 
results suggest that one important way in which politics influence the viability of the IPO market is through 
the channel of local political proximity. The effects of local politics are especially relevant in the light of the 
recent financial crisis recession, and because traditionally they represent a major arena of interactions 
between small businesses and politicians. Therefore, our results may be useful to policymakers interested on 
the impact of uncertainty surrounding their decisions and to investors who try to take advantage of strategies 
based on political geography elements.  
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: IPO Pricing 
Underpricing 
The difference between the first secondary market closing price available in CRSP and IPO offer price, divided by IPO 
offer price. 
Panel B: IPO Characteristics 
Firm age 
The number of years elapsed since firm’s foundation to IPO date, using foundation dates from Thomson Financial 
database as well as from the Field-Ritter dataset. The variable is transformed into the regressions by adding 1 and taking 
the natural logarithm. 
VC  Dummy variable set to 1 for venture capital-backed firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Proceeds The natural logarithm of gross proceeds raised by the IPO estimated as shared offered times the offer price. 
Overhang The ratio of shares retained by the pre-IPO shareholders over shares issued in the offering. 
Underwriter  
Dummy variable set to 1 for most prestigious underwriters, 0 otherwise. Most reputable underwriters are those with a  
ranking score of 9.0 or above based on Jay Ritter’s underwriter (prestige) rankings. 
Internet  
 
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs of Internet firms, and 0 otherwise. Internet firms are classified those with business 
description containing any of the words “Internet”, “Online”, eBusiness”, “eCommerce”, and/or “Website”. 
Technology firm 
 
Dummy variable: one for IPO firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 
3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation 
equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 
4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 
(software). 
Nasdaq Dummy variable set to 1 for NASDAQ-listed IPOs, and 0 otherwise. 
R&D  R&D is the ratio of total R&D expense to total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities over total assets in the fiscal year prior to IPO. 
EPS Dummy variable set to 1 for positive earnings per share in the fiscal year prior to IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
CAPEX R&D is the ratio of total R&D expense to total assets in the IPO year.  
R&D CAPEX is the ratio of total capital expenditures to total assets in the IPO year. 
Panel C: State-Level Characteristics 
Unemployment Rate The state annual unemployment rate from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). 
Real GDP Growth 
Rate  
The annual state GDP growth rate using state GDP (in 2009 dollars) from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). 
Personal Income The natural logarithm of the annual state personal income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
Pane D: Political Variables 
PAI 
The Political Alignment Index developed by Kim et al. (2012) is used as the main proxy for policy risk: PAI = 
(1/4)*Senators + (1/4)*Representatives + (1/4)*Governor + (1/4)*[(1/2)*State Senators + (1/2)*State Representatives] 
ModifiedPAI1 The first variant of PAI: ModifiedPAI1 = (1/3)*Senators + (1/3)*Representatives + (1/3)*Governor 
ModifiedPAI2 The second variant of PAI: ModifiedPAI2 = (1/2)*Senators + (1/2)*Representatives 
ΔPAI The annual change in PAI. 
Regional PAI 
The third variant of PAI: It is computed after averaging the PAI values across all states in a particular geographic region 
(Northeast, South, Midwest, and West). Geographic Regions are defined in note 6. 
BilNum 
The natural logarithm of the number of bills introduced in Congress by politicians from a given state, where the bill 
information is collected from E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, Congressional Bills Project (1984-2012). 
Legislative Activity 
Index 
It is the number of bills introduced over the past 4 months in the political district where the firm’s headquarters is 
located. 
Midterm Election A year dummy that takes 1 if the year is in the second two-year of a four-year presidential term, and zero otherwise. 
PolicyRisk1 It is the BilNum. 
PolicyRisk2 It is the PAI index multiplied by the monthly policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016). 
PolicyRisk3 It is the Bills multiplied by the monthly policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) 
PolicyRisk4 It is the partisan conflict index of Azzimonti (2017). 
PolicyRisk5 The PAI index multiplied by the partisan conflict index of Azzimonti (2017). 
PMC Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs with lobbying and/or PAC contributions, and 0 otherwise.  
Pane E: IPO Survival 
Failure Dummy variable set to 1 if the firm is delisted within five years after its IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
Survival Time The natural logarithm of the time to delist (survival time) which is measured in months. 
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Table 1: Distribution Statistics 
This Table presents distributional statistics for a sample of 1,639 U.S. IPOs from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 
2016. In Panel A the IPOs are described by issue-year, whereas in Panel B the IPOs are distributed by industry. 
Finally, Panel C reports state-level distribution characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix A. IPO deals are 
retrieved from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. 
Panel A: Yearly Distribution of IPO Activity, Underpricing and Political Alignment Index (PAI) 
Year President Senate 
House of 
Representatives 
N. % Underpricing PAI 
2000 Clinton (D) R R 260 15.86 56.48% 0.63 
2001 Bush (R) D R 58 3.54 20.83% 0.44 
2002 Bush (R) R R 48 2.93 9.08% 0.50 
2003 Bush (R) R R 47 2.87 12.72% 0.47 
2004 Bush (R) R R 125 7.63 11.41% 0.47 
2005 Bush (R) R R 114 6.96 9.31% 0.50 
2006 Bush (R) R R 124 7.57 11.27% 0.52 
2007 Bush (R) D D 111 6.77 12.82% 0.38 
2008 Bush (R) D D 17 1.04 6.95% 0.44 
2009 Obama (D) D D 37 2.26 14.18% 0.58 
2010 Obama (D) D D 72 4.39 7.02% 0.60 
2011 Obama (D) D R 68 4.15 14.11% 0.51 
2012 Obama (D)  D R 80 4.88 16.95% 0.52 
2013 Obama (D) D R 136 8.30 20.82% 0.56 
2014 Obama (D) D R 171 10.43 14.98% 0.61 
2015 Obama (D) R R 103 6.28 16.55% 0.56 
2016 Obama (D) R R 68 4.15 10.11% 0.48 
Panel B: Distribution of IPO Activity, Underpricing and Political Alignment Index (PAI) by Industry 
Industry SIC N. Percentage  Underpricing PAI 
Oil and Gas  (13) 62 3.78% 4.79% 0.47 
Food Products  (20) 18 1.10% 10.45% 0.56 
Chemical Products  (28) 330 20.13% 11.48% 0.58 
Manufacturing  (30-34) 36 2.20% 19.07% 0.59 
Computer Equipment & Services  (35, 73) 423 25.81% 36.64% 0.52 
Electronic Equipment  (36) 135 8.24% 39.90% 0.57 
Scientific Instruments  (38) 120 7.32% 16.91% 0.54 
Transportation & Public Utilities (41, 42, 44-49) 127 7.75% 9.72% 0.49 
Wholesale & Retail Trade  (50-59) 144 8.79% 17.37% 0.48 
Entertainment Services  (70,78, 79) 26 1.59% 6.99% 0.45 
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Table 1: Distribution Statistics (continued) 
Panel C: State Distribution of IPO Activity, Underpricing and Political Alignment Index (PAI) 
 PAI Underpricing IPO Activity  PAI Underpricing IPO Activity 
State Mean Mean N State Mean Mean N 
AL 0.39 4.91 2 MS 0.38 61.81 2 
AR 0.40 0.45 2 MT 0.50 1.50 2 
AZ 0.31 22.64 25 NC 0.38 11.85 42 
CA 0.67 28.08 475 ND 0.37 11.53 1 
CO 0.60 12.67 49 NE 0.34 21.14 4 
CT 0.64 16.00 22 NH 0.62 3.90 4 
DE 0.61 35.79 8 NJ 0.37 15.09 71 
FL 0.48 16.33 48 NV 0.56 20.97 9 
GA 0.50 12.76 42 NY 0.62 13.63 77 
HI 0.61 -10.67 1 OH 0.54 12.81 19 
IA 0.44 0.39 3 OK 0.36 6.12 21 
ID 0.46 12.75 2 OR 0.59 0.26 4 
IL 0.46 22.66 64 PA 0.47 9.55 66 
IN 0.37 45.84 12 RI 0.61 6.56 1 
KS 0.35 13.14 6 SC 0.44 102.08 1 
KY 0.51 11.78 7 TN 0.32 5.63 27 
LA 0.33 7.63 7 TX 0.38 15.89 167 
MA 0.66 24.38 145 UT 0.36 8.92 13 
MD 0.62 23.36 34 VA 0.56 26.62 43 
ME 0.36 -5.00 1 WA 0.53 36.26 34 
MI 0.42 8.34 15 WI 0.44 7.49 15 
MN 0.57 20.40 26 WV 0.45 67.30 1 
MO 0.56 9.13 16 WY 0.39 -1.88 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table 2: Administration Distribution by PAI and Underpricing 
This Τable shows the summary statistics of the dependent variable (underpricing) and the main independent variables of 
interest used in the regression analysis (PAI). Panel A and Panel B display the statistics of PAI and underpricing using the 
administration distribution. Panel C utilizes that values of PAI and ranks each state-year the home state of the President, 
Vice President and Speaker. 
Panel A: PAI Distribution by Administration 
Party 
All 
Democrats Republicans Democrats 
Democrats only Republicans only 
President Clinton Bush Obama 
All states 
(mean) 
0.48 0.48 0.51 0.45 0.45 0.51 
All 
states(SD)  
0.30 0.24 0.27 0.35 0.33 0.27 
Top 10 
(Mean) 
0.86 0.77 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.85 
Bottom 10 
(Mean) 
0.15 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.10 0.21 
Panel B: Distribution of Underpricing by Administration 
Party 
All 
Democrats Republicans Democrats 
Democrats only Republicans only 
President Clinton Bush Obama 
All states 
(Mean) 
20.43 56.48 11.91 15.14 25.94 11.91 
All states 
(SD) 
42.55 79.29 24.17 27.53 50.28 24.17 
Top 10 
(Mean) 
26.31 59.94 6.84 18.79 30.94 6.84 
Bottom 10 
(Mean) 
14.79 49.60 14.05 11.01 15.78 14.05 
Panel C: Ranking of the Presidents’, Vice Presidents’ and Speakers’ Home State by PAI 
Position President President 
Vice 
President 
Vice 
President 
Speaker Speaker Speaker 
Name Bush Obama Cheney Biden Hastert Pelosi Boehner 
Political 
Party 
Republican Democratic Republican Democratic Republican Democratic Republican 
Time Period 2001-2008 2009-2016 2001-2008 2009-2016 2001-2006 2007-2010 2011-2016 
State Texas Illinois Wyoming Delaware Illinois California Ohio 
Ranking  4 15 6 1 46 41 32 
PAI 0.87 0.73 0.81 0.94 0.24 0.46 0.19 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
This Table presents the descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,639 U.S. IPOs from 1 January, 2000 to 31 
December, 2016. Firm fundamentals and offering characteristics are illustrated in Panel A. State characteristics are 
reported in panel B. Tests of differences in means between the two sub-samples of IPO firms with high and low 
PAI are based on t-tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Firm Fundamentals and Offering Characteristics 
 Full Sample (N=1,639) High PAI Low PAI Difference 
 Mean SD Mean Mean p-value 
Underpricing 20.43 42.55 24.06 16.78 0.0003 
Firm Age 14.06 18.81 13.67 14.46 0.1975 
Leverage 0.37 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.0224 
Proceeds ($ mil) 218.97 695.81 238.60 199.29 0.1264 
EPS 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.54 0.0000 
VC 0.52 0.50 0.57 0.48 0.0003 
Underwriter 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.38 0.0115 
Internet 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.09 0.0372 
Technology 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.33 0.0214 
Nasdaq 0.69 0.46 0.70 0.68 0.1873 
Panel B: State Characteristics 
Real GDP Growth Rate 2.84 2.34 3.13 2.55 0.0000 
Personal Income  27.02 0.91 27.20 26.85 0.0000 
Unemployment Rate 5.95 1.98 6.40 5.49 0.0000 
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Table 4: Effects of PAI on Underpricing 
This Table displays the effects of PAI on IPO first-day returns using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The sample 
consists of initial public offerings from 2000 to 2016 in the U.S. stock market. The dependent variable is IPO first-day 
returns and is calculated as the percentage change from the first day closing price to offer price. PAI is the Political 
Alignment Index.  Models (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) include PAI, Modified PAI1, Modified PAI2, ΔPAI, and Regional PAI. 
Year, state and industry fixed effects are included but coefficient estimates are not reported. T-statistics are included in the 
parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PAI 
6.60*** 
(3.44) 
 
 
   
Modified PAI1  
7.13* 
(1.94) 
   
Modified PAI2   
8.47*** 
(2.85) 
  
ΔPAI    
3.74*** 
(2.84) 
 
 
Regional PAI     
1.85* 
(1.79) 
Firm Age 
0.15 
(0.18) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
0.16 
(0.19) 
0.95** 
(2.28) 
0.26 
(0.30) 
Leverage 
0.71 
(0.23) 
0.72 
(0.23) 
0.68 
(0.23) 
2.58 
(1.22) 
0.89 
(0.28) 
Proceeds 
2.61* 
(1.90) 
2.63* 
(1.91) 
2.65* 
(1.95) 
1.82 
(1.30) 
2.89* 
(1.87) 
EPS 
3.45 
(1.26) 
3.44 
(1.25) 
3.49 
(1.28) 
1.07 
(0.68) 
3.02 
(1.12) 
Overhang 
1.21*** 
(8.72) 
1.21*** 
(8.57) 
1.21*** 
(8.96) 
0.97*** 
(3.23) 
1.22*** 
(8.75) 
VC 
14.07*** 
(4.16) 
14.05*** 
(4.12) 
14.27*** 
(4.31) 
7.41*** 
(3.80) 
13.88*** 
(8.75) 
Underwriter 
3.13 
(1.40) 
3.09 
(1.37) 
3.08 
(1.39) 
0.96 
(0.76) 
3.18 
(1.40) 
Internet 
-2.78 
(-0.36) 
-2.79 
(-0.36) 
-2.91 
(-0.38) 
-1.41 
(-0.30) 
-2.79 
(-0.36) 
Technology 
6.26* 
(1.89) 
6.28* 
(1.86) 
6.52** 
(2.04) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
6.00* 
(1.90) 
Nasdaq 
3.03 
(0.66) 
3.05 
(1.37) 
3.12 
(0.68) 
1.67 
(0.40) 
2.95 
(0.64) 
Market Return 
0.17*** 
(3.96) 
0.20*** 
(4.10) 
0.23*** 
(3.85) 
0.60* 
(1.91) 
0.25*** 
(3.68) 
Real GDP Growth Rate 
-0.35 
(-0.76) 
-0.31 
(-0.66) 
-0.51 
(-1.15) 
-0.39 
(-0.95) 
-0.26 
(-0.61) 
Personal Income 
-0.01 
(-0.93) 
-0.01 
(-1.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.66) 
0.01 
(0.68) 
-0.01 
(-0.54) 
Unemployment Rate 
-1.26 
(-1.56) 
-1.09 
(-1.60) 
-1.53 
(-1.63) 
-0.76 
(-1.50) 
-0.53 
(-0.74) 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,485 1,524 
Adjusted    0.2635 0.2636 0.2644 0.1498 0.2621 
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Table 5: The Mitigating Role of Political Money Contributions  
This table presents the analysis on the relation between policy risk and underpricing using initially the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method and then the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) procedure. Also, to correct for a possible selection 
bias in a different way, we report the results of the second stage of the estimation of the Heckman (1979) model in 
columns (3) and (4) of Panel B. The dependent variable, underpricing, is calculated as the percentage changes from the 
first day closing price to offer price. PAI is the Political Alignment Index in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Control 
variables are: Company Age, Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, Underwriter, Internet, Technology, Nasdaq, Overhang, 
Market Return, Real GDP Growth, Personal Income and Unemployment Rate Year, Industry and State Dummies. We also 
report the Wald test F-statistics that coefficients of PAI are the same between the subsamples. T-statistics are included in 
parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: The Mitigating Role of Active Political Strategies on the PAI-Underpricing Link using OLS Method 
 (1) (2) 
 (PMC=0) (PMC=1) 
PAI 
9.14*** 
(3.69) 
-5.74 
(-1.30) 
Control Variables Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y 
N 1,351 173 
Adjusted    0.2718 0.5484 
Wald χ2 test 0.00*** 
 
Panel B: The Mitigating Role of Active Political Strategies on the PAI-Underpricing Link using the PSM and the two-
stage Heckman Procedure 
 PSM: One-to-one matching Heckman Procedure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 (PMC=0) (PMC=1) (PMC=0) (PMC=1) 
PAI 
14.85*** 
(3.20) 
315 
(1.62) 
10.11*** 
(4.58) 
-4.40 
(-0.98) 
Inv. Mills Ratio   
0.01 
(0.75) 
-0.01* 
(1.91) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
N 149 149 1,351 173 
Adjusted    0.3818 0.4544 0.3515 0.5312 
Wald χ2 test 0.04** 0.00*** 
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Table 6: Industry Effects and State’s Economic Freedom Index 
This Table presents the results of the mitigating role of the industry and state infrastructure. The dependent variable is the 
IPO underpricing. Models (1) and (2) present analysis on the relation between PAI and underpricing using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) on the Politically Sensitive Industries (PSI) and Economic Freedom (EF) subsamples, respectively. PSI is an 
indicator variable set to one for firms that belong to the following industries: Tobacco Products, Pharmaceuticals, Healthcare 
Services, Defense, Petroleum and Natural Gas, Telecommunications and Transportation where the industry classifications 
are based on Fama-French 48 industries (following Herron et al., 1999). Control variables are: Company Age, Leverage, 
Proceeds, EPS, VC, Underwriter, Internet, Technology, Nasdaq, Overhang, Market Return, Real GDP Growth, Personal 
Income and Unemployment Rate Year, Industry and State Dummies. We also report the Wald test F-statistics that 
coefficients of PAI are the same between the subsamples. T-statistics are included in the parentheses and are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
(1) (2) 
 Politically Sensitive Industries (PSI) Economic Freedom (EF) 
 PSI Non-PSI High EF Low EF 
PAI 
10.83*** 
(6.15) 
4.45** 
(2.33) 
8.24* 
(171) 
23.48*** 
(3.97) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y Y Y 
N 459 1,065 597 687 
Adjusted    0.1754 0.2885 0.3276 0.2235 
Wald χ2 test 0.03** 0.04** 
 
Table 7: Cross-Sectional Tests: Effects of Firm Characteristics on the Association Between PAI and Underpricing 
This Table shows the results of OLS regressions on IPO underpricing using firm-subsamples. Columns (1) and (2) present the 
coefficient estimates of PAI for technology and non-technology firms while columns (3) and (4) display the PAI coefficients 
by firm age. Columns (5) and (6) report the results of PAI on IPO initial returns on the subsamples of firms with high and low 
agency conflicts. A firm is classified as large (small) if its proceeds are larger (smaller) than the sample median. Similarly, a 
firm is considered young (old) if its age is greater (smaller) than the sample median. Using the same logic, a firm has high 
agency problems if its cash flows are higher (smaller) than the sample median. Control variables are: Company Age, 
Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, Underwriter, Internet, Technology, Nasdaq, Overhang, Market Return, Real GDP Growth, 
Personal Income and Unemployment Rate Year, Industry and State Dummies. We also report the Wald test F-statistics that 
coefficients of PAI are the same between the subsamples. T-statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Tech 
firms 
Non-Tech 
firms 
Young 
firms 
Old 
firms 
High Agency 
Conflicts 
Low Agency 
Conflicts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PAI 
14.85*** 
(2.75) 
2.55 
(1.55) 
12.38*** 
(3.74) 
2.86* 
(1.71) 
7.20*** 
(5.30) 
1.93 
(1.25) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 544 980 719 805 1,011 513 
Adjusted    0.3188 0.2034 0.3744 0.2414 0.2423 0.3812 
Wald χ2 test 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 
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Table 8: Robustness Analysis and Additional Tests: Alternative Proxies of Policy Risk 
This Table presents the results of OLS regressions on IPO underpricing using alternative policy risk proxies (PolRisk1, 
PolRisk2, PolRisk3, PolRisk4, and PolRIsk5), following Bradley et al. (2016). The dependent variable is IPO underpricing. 
PolRisk1 is the (BilNum) natural logarithm of the number of bills introduced in Congress by politicians from a given state. 
PolRisk2 is the PAI index multiplied by the monthly national policy uncertainty index (EPU) of Baker et al. (2016). 
PolRisk3 is BilNum multiplied by the monthly EPU, where BilNum is the natural logarithm of the number of bills 
introduced in Congress by politicians from a given state. PolRisk4 is the partisan conflict index (PCI) of Azzimonti (2017), 
and finally PolRisk5 is PAI multiplied by the PCI. Model (1) displays the regression results using PolRisk1 instead of PAI, 
while models (2), (3), (4), and (5) replace PAI with PolRisk2, PolRisk3, PolRisk4, PolRisk5, respectively. Control 
variables are: Company Age, Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, Underwriter, Internet, Technology, Nasdaq, Overhang, Market 
Return, Real GDP Growth, Personal Income and Unemployment Rate Year, Industry and State Dummies. T-statistics are 
included in the parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by state. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PolRisk1 
0.84*** 
(4.00) 
    
PolRisk2  
0.04* 
(1.91) 
   
PolRisk3 
  
0.06*** 
(4.06) 
  
PolRisk4 
   
0.10** 
(2.05) 
 
PolRisk5     
0.07*** 
(4.16) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,524 
Adjusted    0.2635 0.2626 0.2632 0.2636 0.2645 
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Table 9: Robustness Analysis and Additional Tests: Industry- and State Fixed Effects and Influential States 
This Table shows the results of additional robustness tests. The dependent variable is IPO underpricing. Panel A displays the 
effect of PAI on underpricing excluding industry and state fixed effects. Panel B reruns the baseline results after excluding 
influential states high/low PAI. The following models describe in detail the specification of Panel A. Model (1) and (2) 
consider alternative industry classifications. Model (3) reports the results without industry fixed effects. Model (4) presents 
the result without industry- and state-fixed effects. Control variables are: Company Age, Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, 
Underwriter, Internet, Technology, Nasdaq, Overhang, Market Return, Real GDP Growth, Personal Income and 
Unemployment Rate Year, Industry and State Dummies. T-statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Excluding Industry and State Fixed Effects 
 
FF17 FF30 Excluding industry-fixed effects 
Excluding industry- and state-
fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PAI 
5.24*** 
(4.12) 
6.23*** 
(4.43) 
5.24*** 
(3.82) 
5.38*** 
(3.42) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y N N 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y N 
State Cluster Y Y Y Y 
N 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,524 
Adjusted    0.2439 0.2577 0.2301 0.2173 
 
Panel B: Excluding Potential Influential States with High/Low PAI 
 
States with High PAI States with Low PAI 
 Massachusetts California New York Texas Georgia Tennessee 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PAI 
5.10* 
(1.79) 
7.69*** 
(3.01) 
6.89*** 
(3.61) 
9.91*** 
(6.79) 
6.23*** 
(3.41) 
6.81*** 
(3.77) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,380 1,081 1,451 1.371 1,487 1,497 
Adjusted    0.2638 0.2881 0.2733 0.2606 0.2649 0.2643 
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Table 10: The Effect of PAI on Post-IPO Return Volatility 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using post-IPO volatility measures. Panel A displays the summary statistics 
of Post-IPO Return and Idiosyncratic Volatility. Panel B and C present the results of the impact of PAI on Post-IPO Return 
and Idiosyncratic Volatility. Post-IPO return volatility is the dependent variable and is computed over +5 to +26 (trading) 
days post-IPO in Column (1), +5 to +63 days post-IPO in Column (2), +5 to +126 days post-IPO in Column (3), and +5 to 
+189 days post-IPO in Column (4), 5 to +252 days post-IPO in Column (5), 5 to +504 days post-IPO in Column (6), 5 to 
+756 days post-IPO in Column (7) (first week is ignored since there may be unusual trading activity because of share 
flipping). Control variables are: Company Age, Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, Underwriter, Internet, Technology, Nasdaq, 
Overhang, Market Return, Real GDP Growth, Personal Income and Unemployment Rate Year, Industry and State Dummies.  
T-statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by state. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Post-IPO Volatility Measures 
 Full Sample High PAI Low PAI Difference 
 Mean Mean Mean p-value 
Post-IPO Return volatility 
+5 to +21 days post-IPO 0.039 0.044 0.034 0.0000 
+5 to +63 days post-IPO 0.041 0.045 0.038 0.0000 
+5 to +126 days post-IPO 0.042 0.045 0.038 0.0000 
+5 to +189 days post-IPO 0.043 0.046 0.039 0.0000 
+5 to +252 days post-IPO 0.043 0.046 0.039 0.0000 
+5 to +504 days post-IPO 0.178 0.188 0.169 0.0004 
+5 to +756 days post-IPO 0.175 0.179 0.172 0.1332 
Post-IPO Idiosyncratic Volatility 
+5 to +21 days post-IPO 0.038 0.042 0.034 0.0000 
+5 to +63 days post-IPO 0.040 0.043 0.037 0.0000 
+5 to +126 days post-IPO 0.041 0.044 0.037 0.0000 
+5 to +189 days post-IPO 0.041 0.044 0.038 0.0000 
+5 to +252 days post-IPO 0.041 0.043 0.038 0.0000 
+5 to +504 days post-IPO 0.040 0.041 0.038 0.0075 
+5 to +756 days post-IPO 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.2000 
Panel B: Impact of PAI on Post-IPO Return Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PAI 
0.01*** 
(2.65) 
0.01** 
(2.27) 
0.01*** 
(2.99) 
0.01*** 
(3.34) 
0.01** 
(2.18 
-0.01 
(-0.71) 
-0.01 
(-1.24) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,107 918 
Adjusted    0.4975 0.5950 0.6554 0.6743 0.6407 0.5110 0.4490 
Panel C: Impact of PAI on Post-IPO Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PAI 
0.01 
(1.35) 
0.01*** 
(2.89) 
0.01** 
(2.52) 
0.01** 
(2.41) 
0.01*** 
(3.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.73) 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,176 1,174 1,172 1,166 1,156 1,026 842 
Adjusted    0.4409 0.5817 0.6315 0.6014 0.5896 0.5514 0.5497 
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Table 11: The Effect of PAI on Investment Measures 
This Table shows the results of additional tests using post-IPO investment measures. Model (1) considers as dependent 
variable the sum of R&D and CAPEX over the sales on the issue year. Models (2) and (3) report the results using as 
dependent variables the investment measures of CAPEX and R&D. R&D is the ratio of total R&D expense to total sales in 
the IPO year. CAPEX is the ratio of total capital expenditures to total sales in the IPO year. Control variables are: Company 
Age, Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, Underwriter, Internet, Technology, Nasdaq, Overhang, Market Return, Real GDP 
Growth, Personal Income and Unemployment Rate Year, Industry and State Dummies. T-statistics are included in the 
parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
R&D and CAPEX CAPEX  R&D  
 (1) (2) (3) 
PAI 
-0.73** 
(-2.28) 
-0.39** 
(-2.38) 
-0.34* 
(-1.71) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y Y 
N 1,183 1,183 1,183 
Adjusted    0.2750 0.1548 0.4685 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 12: Long-Term Implication of PAI 
This Table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of the probability of failure and time-to failure as 
well as the estimation of the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. In Model (1), our dependent variable is whether or 
not a firm survived 5 years after its IPO. The baseline hazard function   ( ) is estimated using the following Cox model:  
 ( )    ( )                                             , where   is the time to failure (i.e., the duration to the 
delisting date). In Model (2), our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the time to delist (survival time) which is 
measured in months. With respect to the AFT model, we estimate the following specific model where the natural 
logarithm of the time to delist (survival time) is presented as a linear function of the covariates:   (  )     
                                     , where   (  ) is the natural logarithm of the survival time or time to 
failure.The Weibull distribution was selected based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Time ratios are the 
exponentiated coefficients, exp(β), and measure the extent to which changes in covariates accelerate or decelerate the 
occurrence of event (delisting). Regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. 
T-statistics are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 Cox Model AFT Model 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient  Hazard Ratio Coefficient Time Ratio 
PAI 
0.52*** 
(3.10) 
1.688 
-0.45*** 
(-3.39) 
0.638 
Firm Age 0.07* 
(1.66) 
1.073 
-0.09** 
(-2.47) 
0.914 
Leverage -0.10 
(-0.89) 
0.905 
0.07 
(0.82) 
1.073 
Proceeds -0.10** 
(-2.06) 
0.903 
0.10** 
(2.55) 
1.105 
EPS 0.12 
(1.30) 
1.129 
-0.05 
(-0.67) 
0.951 
Overhang 0.01 
(0.48) 
1.002 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
0.990 
VC 0.04 
(0.35) 
1.039 
-0.17** 
(-2.00) 
0.844 
Underwriter -0.16* 
(-1.67) 
0.847 
0.30*** 
(3.66) 
1.350 
Internet -0.17 
(-1.08) 
0.841 
-0.13 
(-1.15) 
0.878 
Technology -0.32 
(-1.41) 
0.723 
0.20 
(1.11) 
1.221 
Nasdaq -0.10 
(-0.83) 
0.905 
-0.03 
(0.36) 
0.970 
Market Return -1.59 
(-1.40) 
0.203 
0.98 
(1.03) 
2.664 
Real GDP Growth Rate -0.01 
(-0.27) 
0.994 
-0.01 
(-0.58) 
0.990 
Personal Income -0.01*** 
(-4.55) 
0.999 
0.01*** 
(4.65) 
1.010 
Unemployment Rate -0.42*** 
(-5.30) 
0.656 
0.61*** 
(5.45) 
1.840 
Industry, Year and State 
FE 
Y  Y 
 
 
Chi-Square 841.96  1,977.42  
N 1,062  1,062  
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Figure 1: Map of PAI 
This figure shows the map of PAI in forty six states from 2000 to 2016. For each state, we compute 
the average PAI during the sample period. 
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Internet Appendix 
This appendix provides the following empirical tests: 
 Table 1 presents the correlation matrices of IPO pricing, firm fundamentals and other state 
variables. 
 Table 2 presents the yearly distribution of the Partisan Conflict Index and the Index of Economic 
Freedom. 
 Table 3 presents the legislative activities for the PAI sub-groups. 
 Table 4 presents an indicative list of ten companies located in low (high) PAI stated including their 
underpricing. 
 Table 5 presents an indicative list of ten companies located in low (high) PAI stated including their 
survival rates. 
 Table 6 presents the top (bottom) ten Industries based on the PAI distribution. 
 Table 7 presents the top (bottom) ten states based on the number of IPO survivors. 
 Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics based on whether firms engage in 
Political Money Contributions (PMC). 
 Table 9 presents the results of OLS regressions of PAI on IPO underpricing for along different 
political periods 
 Table 10 reports the tests for Endogeneity Control and Sample Selection Bias. 
 Figure 2 presents a graphical depiction of the PAI distribution by state in 2000. 
 Figure 3 presents a graphical depiction of the PAI distribution by state in 2004. 
 Figure 4 presents a graphical depiction of the PAI distribution by state in 2008. 
 Figure 5 presents a graphical depiction of the PAI distribution by state in 2012. 
 Figure 6 presents a graphical depiction of the PAI distribution by state in 2016. 
 Figure 7 presents a breakdown of IPO PMC expenditures by type. 
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix 
This Table reports pairwise correlations for the main variables employed in our analysis. The sample consists of 1,639 
IPOs that floated U.S. stock exchanges from the 1st of January 2000 to the 31st of December 2016. We relied on the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) Database to retrieve information on IPO deals. Accounting data were collected from 
CRSP and Compustat databases. Panel A reports correlations of IPO pricing variables, while Panel B presents 
correlations of IPO offering variables. Finally, Panel C presents the correlations of state-level variables 
Panel A: IPO Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1. Firm age         
2. Leverage -0.0091        
3. Proceeds 0.0138 0.0299       
4. Earnings per Share 0.0407 0.0162 0.2563      
5. VC -0.0257 -0.0047 -0.3425 -0.3725     
6. Underwriter -0.0229 -0.0040 0.4594 0.1054 -0.0988    
7. Internet Firm -0.0178 -0.0138 -0.0030 -0.0609 0.1218 0.0311   
8. Technology Firm -0.0021 -0.0470 -0.1219 -0.1318 0.2740 -0.0075 0.2756  
9. Nasdaq -0.0049 0.0166 -0.4474 -0.2492 0.3872 -0.3561 0.0385 0.1594 
Panel B: State Variables (10) (11) (12)      
10. PAI         
11. Real GDP Growth Rate 0.0666        
12. Personal Income 0.1515 0.1520       
13. Unemployment Rate 0.2130 -0.3684 0.3787      
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Table 2: Yearly Distribution of the Partisan Conflict Index and the Index of Economic Freedom 
This Table presents distributional statistics for a sample of 1,639 U.S. IPOs from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 
2016. The IPOs are described by issue-year, whereas in panel B the IPOs are distributed by industry. IPO deals are 
retrieved from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. 
Year Partisan Conflict Index Economic Freedom 
2000 81.46 8.40 
2001 79.43 8.23 
2002 80.04 8.22 
2003 93.23 8.20 
2004 92.61 8.20 
2005 85.99 8.02 
2006 80.06 7.99 
2007 84.21 8.07 
2008 85.67 8.01 
2009 88.74 7.79 
2010 132.20 7.70 
2011 144.23 7.65 
2012 146.48 7.74 
2013 166.87 7.62 
2014 142.77 7.67 
2015 148.72 7.74 
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Table 3: Legislative Activity and PAI Effect 
The Table reports the legislative activities for the PAI sub-groups. Legislative activities are measured as the number of 
bills introduced and passed by politicians from a particular state. In Panel B, we regress underpricing using OLS 
method:                                                                                      .Legislative Activity Index 
(LAI) is the number of bills introduced over the past 4 months in the political district where the firm’s headquarters is 
located. High legislative activity index is a dummy that takes one if the LAI is higher than the median value and zero 
otherwise. 
 Number of Bills Introduced 
(per state-year) 
Number of Bills Passed 
(per state-year) 
PAI quartile 1 
(Lowest) 
100.3 3.7 
PAI quartile 2 106.5 3.4 
PAI quartile 3 131.2 4.1 
PAI quartile 4 
(Highest) 
135.3 3.9 
Mean difference 35.0*** 0.2** 
(Highest-Lowest) (3.51) (2.13) 
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Table 4: Underpricing Example of Ten Companies with Headquarters in High (Low) PAI States 
The Table reports an indicative list with ten firms operating in high (low) PAI states along with their corresponding 
underpricing. 
Panel A: Indicative List of Ten Companies Operating in High PAI States 
IPO Date Company State 
Money left on the 
table (in million $) 
Initial Returns PAI 
18/5/2011 LinkedIn Corp California 352.8 109.44 0.91 
18/4/2012 Splunk Inc California 249.48 108.71 0.91 
30/1/2014 Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc California 122.41 101.19 0.91 
27/2/2014 Varonis Systems Inc New York 105.60 100.00 0.82 
12/4/2000 Nuance Communications Inc Massachusetts -0.39 99.63 1.00 
19/9/2013 Rocket Fuel Inc California 108.40 93.45 0.91 
22/6/2016 Twilio Inc California 137.90 91.93 0.93 
5/10/2016 Coupa Software Inc California 113.07 84.89 0.93 
19/9/2013 FireEye Inc California 242.80 80.00 0.93 
27/1/2014 CymaBay Therapeutics Inc California 45.82 80.00 0.91 
Panel B: Indicative List of Ten Companies Operating in Low PAI States 
IPO Date Company State 
Money left on the 
table (in million $) 
Initial Returns PAI 
24/4/2002 DOV Pharmaceutical Inc New Jersey -21.50 -33.08 0.12 
2/11/2006 ORBCOMM Inc New Jersey -30.00 -29.55 0.12 
18/11/2011 Digital Domain Media Group Inc Florida -9.10 -21.76 0.19 
10/5/2011 FriendFinder Networks Inc Florida -84.48 -21.50 0.19 
13/12/2011 Sanchez Energy Corp Texas -20.00 -17.05 0.07 
5/3/2015 MaxPoint Interactive Inc 
North 
Carolina 
-11.31 -15.13 0.06 
15/3/2001 SureBeam Corp(Titan Corp) California -1.71 -14.06 0.10 
4/8/2015 Amplify Snack Brands Inc Texas -27.90 -10.33 0.08 
25/5/2016 Cotiviti Holdings Inc Georgia -23.62 -9.95 0.07 
16/1/2014 EP Energy Corp Texas -67.58 -9.60 0.08 
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Table 5: Top/Bottom IPO Issuers Based on the Level of Political Alignment Index (PAI) 
This Table presents distributional statistics for a sample of 1,639 U.S. IPOs from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 
2016. The IPOs are described by issue-year, whereas in panel B the IPOs are distributed by industry. IPO deals are 
retrieved from the Thomson ONE Banker database. 
Panel A: Indicative Ten Companies Operating in a High PAI state 
IPO 
Date 
Company State 
Age at 
IPO 
PAI Survivorship PMC 
30/3/2000 ArrowPoint Communications Inc Massachusetts 1.79 1.00 0 0 
23/9/2003 AMIS Holdings Inc Idaho 2.83 1.00 0 0 
27/3/2013 NV5 Holdings Inc Delaware 1.10 1.00 0 0 
31/7/2014 Loxo Oncology Inc Connecticut 0.69 1.00 0 0 
10/8/2010 MediaMind Technologies Inc New York 4.66 0.97 0 0 
9/1/2014 GlycoMimetics Inc Maryland 2.71 0.97 0 1 
12/11/2013 Chegg Inc California 1.95 0.93 0 1 
29/5/2002 Overstock.com Inc Utah 2.20 0.92 1 0 
11/12/2003 International Steel Group Inc Ohio 1.79 0.92 0 0 
7/10/2009 Omeros Corp Washington 2.40 0.92 1 0 
Panel B: Indicative Ten Companies Operating in a Low PAI state 
14/4/2014 Paycom Software Inc Oklahoma 3.74 0.00 0 0 
17/12/2013 AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc Kansas 0.00 0.00 0 1 
21/3/2013 West Corp Nebraska 1.95 0.00 0 0 
15/2/2007 Salary.com Inc Massachusetts 4.61 0.00 0 0 
31/1/2000 SkillSoft Corp New Hampshire 3.56 0.00 1 0 
19/4/2012 Midstates Petroleum Co Inc Oklahoma 3.09 0.05 0 0 
26/6/2014 ServiceMaster Global Hldgs Inc Tennessee 2.77 0.06 0 1 
7/5/2008 Colfax Corp Maryland 2.40 0.06 1 1 
13/12/2011 Sanchez Energy Corp Texas 1.10 0.07 1 0 
4/5/2006 Northstar Neuroscience Inc Washington 2.77 0.08 0 1 
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Table 6: Top/Bottom IPO Industries Based on the Level of Political Alignment Index (PAI) 
This Table reports an indicative list with ten industries operating in the top and bottom ten industries. 
Top 10 Industries Bottom 10 Industries 
Industries PAI Industries PAI 
Defense 0.89 Chemicals 0.46 
Shipping Contain 0.74 Trading 0.45 
Fabricated Products 0.73 Machinery 0.43 
Construction Mat 0.70 Almost Nothing 0.42 
Printing and Pub 0.69 Utilities 0.40 
Beer & Liquor 0.69 Business Suppliers 0.40 
Agriculture 0.66 Textiles 0.38 
Aircraft 0.64 Recreation 0.25 
Construction 0.63 Non-Metallic and 0.24 
Candy & Soda 0.63 Tobacco Products 0.17 
 
Table 7: Top and Bottom Ten States Based on the Numbers of Survivors 
This Table displays an indicative list with ten states based on the number of survivors. 
Top 10 States  Bottom 10 States 
States Number of Survivors States Number of Survivors 
California 204 Alabama 2 
Texas 81 Montana 2 
Massachusetts 54 New Hampshire 2 
Illinois 35 Wyoming 2 
New York 34 Arkansas 1 
Pennsylvania 29 Idaho 1 
New Jersey 27 Iowa 1 
Virginia 24 Mississippi 1 
Colorado 21 North Dakota 1 
Florida 21 West Virginia 1 
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Table 8: Summary Statistics of IPO Issuers Based on Political Activity 
This Table presents the descriptive statistics based on whether a firm has Political Money Contributions (PMC) or not 
for a sample of 1,639 U.S. IPOs from 1 January, 2000 to 31 December, 2016. The number of PMC firms is 181. 
 PMC=0 PMC=1 Difference 
 Mean Mean p-value 
Underpricing 20.95 16.19 0.0778 
Firm Age 2.20 2.19 0.4441 
Leverage 0.37 0.42 0.9316 
Proceeds 4.39 5.23 0.0000 
EPS 0.45 0.52 0.9542 
VC 0.54 0.41 0.0007 
Underwriter 0.38 0.61 0.0000 
Internet 0.10 0.11 0.6695 
Technology 0.37 0.25 0.0007 
Nasdaq 0.72 0.48 0.0000 
 
Table 9: Time effects of PAI on IPO First-Day Returns 
This Table demonstrates the results of OLS regressions of PAI on IPO underpricing for along different political periods. 
The dependent variable, underpricing, is calculated as the percentage change from the first day closing price to offer price. 
Model (1) and (2) display the results when the administration is controlled from Democrats and Republicans. Model (3)-(6) 
present the findings of the influence of PAI on IPO returns for the election years, non-election years, before midterm 
elections and after midterm elections. Before midterm elections is equal to one if the IPO firm is issued within two years 
before the election date and zero otherwise. After midterm elections is equal to one if the IPO firm is issued within two 
years after the election date and zero otherwise. Control variables are: Company Age, Leverage, Proceeds, EPS, VC, 
Underwriter, Internet, Technology, Nasdaq, Overhang, Market Return, Real GDP Growth, Personal Income and 
Unemployment Rate Year, Industry and State Dummies. T-statistics are included in the parentheses, are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustered by state. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Democratic 
administrations 
Republican 
administrations 
Election years  
(President) 
Non-election 
years  
(President) 
Before midterm 
Elections 
After midterm 
Elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PAI 
23.60** 
(3.39) 
10.30 
(1.45) 
13.50 
(1.55) 
2.85*** 
(2.95) 
0.99 
(1.68) 
4.90** 
(2.83) 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 702 822 486 1,038 721 711 
Adjusted    0.2162 0.3269 0.3365 0.1737 0.2024 0.1958 
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Table 10: Endogeneity Control and Sample Selection Bias 
This Table reports the relevant tests for endogeneity and sample selection bias. Panel A illustrates the average treatment 
effect of the treated for IPO issuers located in high and low PAI states controlling for the endogeneity of Political 
Alignment Index (PAI) using propensity score matching (PSM). The sample consists of initial public offerings from 
2000 to 2016 in the US stock market. As for the binary feature of PAI (High PAI); if the PAI is above the median, then 
High PAI is set to 1, otherwise is 0. The outcome variable is IPO initial returns, calculated as the percentage changes 
from the first day closing price to offer price. The variables used for matching include: Firm Age, Leverage, Proceeds, 
EPS, VC, Underwriter, Internet, Technology, Nasdaq, Market Return, Real GDP Growth, Personal Income and 
Unemployment Rate Year, Industry and State Dummies. Panel B displays the effects of PAI on IPO first-day returns 
using the Heckman two-step treatment effect model. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching 
  (1) 
 Initial Returns 
ATET 
(High PAI vs. Low PAI) 
7.83*** 
(2.73) 
 
N 1,524 
 
Table 10: Endogeneity Control and Sample Selection Bias (continued) 
Panel B: Heckman Two-Step Treatment Effect Model of Political Alignment Index 
 Selection Outcome 
 (1) (2) 
PAI  
3.69** 
(2.02) 
Firm Age 0.13*** 
(3.70) 
-3.37 
(-1.48) 
Leverage 0.17** 
(1.97) 
-5.13 
(-1.24) 
Proceeds -0.05 
(-1.24) 
4.28** 
(2.30) 
EPS -0.39*** 
(-5.17) 
11.39* 
(1.93) 
Overhang 0.03*** 
(3.95) 
1.15*** 
(3.92) 
VC -0.03 
(-0.37) 
14.67*** 
(3.92) 
Underwriter 0.09 
(1.14) 
2.94 
(0.76) 
Internet 0.07 
(0.61) 
-2.43 
(-0.47) 
Technology -0.08 
(-1.04) 
13.84*** 
(3.83) 
Nasdaq -0.06 
(-0.63) 
8.13** 
(2.05) 
Market Return -0.27*** 
(-3.87) 
-0.46** 
(2.38) 
Real GDP Growth Rate 0.11*** 
(6.78) 
0.90 
(0.56) 
Personal Income 0.01 
(1.62) 
-0.01 
(-0.66) 
Unemployment Rate 0.22*** 
(9.43) 
-4.45* 
(-1.72) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  
-29.01 
(-1.40) 
N 1,524 
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Figure 1: IPO Activity by State 
 
Figure 2: PAI Distribution by State (2000) Figure 3: PAI Distribution by State (2004) 
  
 
Figure 4: PAI Distribution by State (2008) Figure 5: PAI Distribution by State (2012) 
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Figure 6: PAI Distribution by State (2016) 
Figure 7: Breakdown of IPO PMC Expenditure by 
Type 
 
 
 
Non-PMC 
1,458 
(88.96%) 
Just PACs  
23 (1.40%) 
Just Lobby 
128 
(7.81%) 
Both 
Lobby-PAC 
30 (1.83%) 
PMC 
181 
(11.04%) 
